Withdrawal from Iraq?

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq is now on the table. Rep. Jack Murtha and some Democrats favor a complete withdrawal immediately. Senator Russell Feingold has called for one in a year. Senators Kerry and Biden and more Democrats support a partial withdrawal. There a three rationales for a withdrawal, aside from any wish to simply disengage from a war that they (and this writer) view as a mistake. The first, which Murtha suggests, is that if we leave, the Iraqis will be forced to step up to the plate to defend themselves. Murtha assumes that, just as the ill-trained colonists were able to defeat the professional Redcoats after 1776, so the ill-trained Iraqis will find the strength and skill to defeat the insurgents.

The second rationale is that much of the insurgency is fueled by the presence of American troops. The third is that the insurgency gains strength because of the sense that the Americans will never leave. The second and third rationales are linked. A complete withdrawal, of course, addresses both. A partial withdrawal (and a timetable, for that matter), provides hope that the Americans will soon be on their way out and so indirectly addresses the second rationale.

The Administration opposes a withdrawal largely on the grounds that it would send a wrong message to both our allies and our enemies in Iraq and in the rest of the Middle East.

Any proposal for a withdrawal makes assumptions about the capabilities of Iraqi forces that will not be addressed here, aside from noting that those who favor withdrawal tend to optimistic at the same time that many of them criticize the Administration for being ineffective in training the Iraqi forces and the Administration is pessimistic while arguing that the training is effective. We cannot now know which side is right. We can only guess.

Another interesting set of assumptions on both sides, however, is about the message that a withdrawal sends. Or, rather, messages, because different groups will, in fact, get different messages if our troops leave. This is a case where both sides of an argument are correct. The difference is really about whose point will prove to be the more significant.

There are five possible audiences within the Arab world listening to sounds. We will leave aside the greater Middle East, Europe, and the American electorate, all of whom have their ears cocked to catch any words uttered about withdrawal, as the discussion about a withdrawal is focused on its consequences for American policy in Iraq. The insurgents, of course, who can be divided into the irreconcilable foreigners and the domestic insurgents (see my last two posts for more on divisions within the insurgency), and lastly, the Iraqi people who do not actively oppose us. The last group can assuredly be subdivided as well, but we will avoid that complication here.

The President asserted in his speech in Annapolis that a withdrawal or a timetable to withdraw "will encourage the terrorists, it will confuse the Iraqi people." There can be little doubt about the first part of this formulation, particularly if they do not fear the Iraqi security forces. Almost assuredly, they do not now fear them. The second part, confusing the Iraqi people, is curious. Rather than describe a departure as abandoning our friends, he describes consequences that are somewhat less serious. Why? At least part of it has to be that he does not want to suggest that the Iraqi security forces are not on the verge of becoming able to hold their own against the opposition. It might also be that he is holding open the possibility of a change in position. After all, important forces in Iraq have been calling for a timetable for withdrawal. Moqtada El-Sadr is one. The Cairo conference, held last month under the auspices of the Arab League is another. Negotiating a timetable for withdrawal with the government that will be elected on December 15 would have benefits for both sides--it would help legitimate the Iraqis and help the Administration lead us out of an increasingly unpopular war. A timetable created under such circumstances need not cause confusion in Iraq.

President Bush minimizes the effects that a withdrawal will have on the Iraqi people; those who favor one focus on those effects almost exclusively. All who favor withdrawal see the American presence in Iraq as a source of anger among Iraqis that helps to fill the ranks of the insurgency. An American withdrawal, therefore, far from sowing confusion among Iraqis will, they argue, make it clear to the Iraqi people and, perhaps, the domestic insurgents that the current government is legitimate. The insurgency would then weaken; the irreconcilables would be defeated and fade away.

These are not their terms, of course, and I may be suggesting an argument that the proponents of withdrawal do not make. Nonetheless, if seems to follow easily from what they say. If the withdrawal did not help legitimate the government, then its collapse and either anarchy or the victory of the insurgents must follow. No one suggests that.

Murtha. Kerry, and others make the additional argument that with the Americans gone, our Iraqi allies would become more effective. If you favor withdrawal and are concerned about the subsequent outcome in Iraq, you must believe that the legitimacy and effectiveness of our Iraqi allies will increase, at least relative to those of the insurgents. That is the bottom line, and neither legitimacy nor effectiveness can be assumed.

Yet that is close to what many of the proponents of withdrawal do. Murtha, Kerry, and others make assertions about what will happen. They argue based on historical precedent and experience, but much of what they say amounts to a leap in the dark. The failure of the president to come with a timeline of some kind for withdrawing from Iraq seems increasingly untenable politically. Yet the case for withdrawing is not tied to a strong case that a withdrawal will do anything but weaken our allies. A decision will soon be made that will engender costs to be borne. Let us hope they are seen clearly.