At this writing, the day after Saddam Hussein was hanged, the irrelevance of his person to the current situation in Iraq remains clear. As a symbol, however, he is likely to live on, a hero to many Sunnis, a devil to the Kurds and Shiites, a sign of the divisions among them all. Indeed, the timing of his death shows these divisions: Sunnis wanted him to live; Shiites wanted him dead as soon as the noose could be tied; Kurds wanted him killed later, for his massacres of the Kurds.
Saddam dead becomes a more important symbol than was Saddam alive. His execution leaves the problems of Iraq intact. The Bush administration has promised us that it will outline a new approach in the next week or two. It is becoming clearer that our presence in Iraq will shrink. The Bush administration is likely to do it. If it doesn't, the next one will.
There will be no military victory. Nor is there likely to be country-wide peace anytime soon. The execution of Saddam--the timing of the death and the reported cries of "Moqtada! Moqtada!" in the minute before he died--seemed to be one more indication that the government is run largely by Shiites for Shiite interests. How can the government gain the confidence and the resignation of the Sunni minority? From this distance, it seems not to try.
Indeed, the internal struggle may be insoluble no matter what influence outside powers seem to have. But outside powers--the regional powers above all--have it in their interest to foster a quiet, stable Iraq. Yet the United States seems determined to continue to go it alone. As for so long, we will talk to our friends, but not to Syria and Iran, who are not enemies, but clearly not inclined to amicability.
The Baker-Hamilton Commission, of course, put a New Diplomatic Offensive at the top of its list of recommendations. It has not been rejected, but it was not warmly received. Moreover, Secretary Rice has argued against a new, direct approach to Syria and Iran (See her comments to Jim Lehrer and Reuters ). In essence they seem to boil down to two. First, our positions have been made clear to both countries; if they want a stable Iraq, they can act to get it. Second, in the case of Iran, we would risk having to negotiate over their nuclear program, the continuation of which is non-negotiable.
As I have written before, talks are risky and their success is not guaranteed. Nor do either Syria or Iran have clean hands in Iraq. But talks and their close partner, negotiations, can at the very least put new arguments on the table, ready to be examined by the other side. They can clarify positions that seem ambiguous; they can correct misperceptions. And they can suggest a flexibility, a reasonableness, that unfortunately seems foreign to administration policy in the Middle East.
Whatever choice is made at the beginning of 2007, the American position in Iraq will be vastly different by its end. The prospects give us little to celebrate at this New Year; let us hope that their fulfillment gives us much at the next.
