She burst onto the political scene as the incandescent center of the Republican campaign, outshining both Obama and her running mate. Her star has faded somewhat, now that the McCain ticket seems doomed to defeat tomorrow. Yet she has expressed her desire to continue as a leader of her party no matter the outcome of the election. Her many supporters would support her in a a quest to become the first female president in 2012.
She is undeniably formidable. It have become trite, but it's true nonetheless, to say that she is a talented politician. Barring some misfortune or horrendous mistake on her part, we will be hearing from her for years.
Let no one doubt that she speaks for an important element of our polity, despite her increasing lack of appeal to many. This is one of the striking things about her. It was noted by several commentators in September that people in her audience wanted someone in office who was just like them. A friend of mine noted that she (my friend) wanted anyone but someone like herself to be making major decisions for this country. That had me thinking. The truth is that most of my friends would be comfortable in an extended conversation with Obama. I would be delighted. No, we are not half African, we did not grow up in Hawaii and Indonesia. All the same, we speak the same language. We think in similar ways. We have much the same perspective on this country and its problems.
I can't say the same about Palin. Despite having the same skin color, despite coming from suburban America as she does, she is foreign to me. But not to others. We can't dismiss those others as ill informed, unthinking Know-Nothings. My friends, and I, tend to do that. Indeed, the school that two of my kids go to has just sent out a letter urging respect for all political opinions. I have no doubt that it was Republicans who were being dissed, as if there were something unseemly in supporting the hero and the hockey mom. But those who applauded Palin as a kindred soul have a perspective that must be respected and should be understood. I confess to finding the latter difficult.
Palin herself does not help. She is bright, but uncurious. She is a brilliant speaker, but her speeches are concatenated assertions that only hint at argument. Her world is Manichean, divided between those who are good and those who are not. The line she draws between truth and falsehood is thin.
Consequently, it is not clear how much of what she says she believes. It is not clear how much has been thought through. We don't know how much she knows. The only thing consistent in her words and her actions is ambition. Those opacities make it difficult to understand the source of her appeal to those who seek someone just like them.
Yet we owe it to ourselves and our country to do just that, particularly if Obama triumphs, as now seems likely. Peter Beinart, writing in The Washington Post this morning, called Palin the "Last of the Culture Warriors." That seems too optimistic by half. Should the Republicans lose, a savage battle for the soul of the GOP can be expected to follow. Palin can be expected to be in the middle of it. Her defeat in that battle cannot be assumed. Her victory could be disastrous for both the Republican Party and the polity as a whole. Coolly dismissing those to whom she gives voice may bring that disaster upon us.
03 November 2008
01 September 2008
Russia-Georgia: Hot War! Cold War?
The reaction to Russia's incursion into Georgia has revealed chasms dividing peoples in the Caucasus and dividing East and West. The latter is reminiscent of the Cold War. It reveals a lack of understanding on both sides. I find that lack of understanding almost incredible, but I must admit to having fallen into it myself.
The truth is that like most conflicts, this one is more complex than a cursory glance through the headline suggests. The initial reaction of most people in the United States--and my own--was that the Russians had attacked the Georgians with no provocation, merely to further their own ambitions in the Caucasus. McCain announced that "We are all Georgians." Commentators everywhere echoed such thoughts. Saakashvili was omnipresent in the media, making his vehemently in English.
I was struck by the vehemence of the reaction by Russians--not the Russian government, but Russians like Gorbachev and others writing in the American press. The insisted strongly that their country had acted correctly and in defense of a helpless people, the Ossetians.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) can be counted on to present a sophisticated understanding of such issues. Indeed, they have done so with their analyses of the conflicts in Georgia. The Georgians were far from blameless. The conflict might have arisen if President Gamsakhurdia had not ended the autonomy of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1991. Since then, after a hard-fought civil war, the Georgians have made no effort to reincorporate either the Ossetians or the Abkhaz into Georgia. These minorities have followed a basic principle of international relations--the enemy of my enemy is my friend. So they have leaned on Russia for protection.
The Georgians could have made an effort to wean these peoples away from their protector. They did quite the opposite and, in the end, miscalculated badly by attacking the Ossetians. Thus the Russian counterattack.
That was where some Western commentators left the story (for example, Paul Craig Roberts, whose purposely provocative commentary in Counterpunch is both scurrilous and profoundly ignorant). So, too, did some of the Russians I had read, though their criticisms were often thoughtful.
The Russians, however, were pushing interests that in a different era could have been labelled imperialist. Earlier in 2008 they made a series of political, diplomatic, and military moves that strengthened their support of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (See the ICG Report "Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia"). The Georgians responded with their own provocations. Finally, on August 7, they invaded Tskhinvali. The speed and strength of the Russian response suggests that they had prepared for such an event.
The Russians have succeeded not just in helping the Ossetians, satisfying the immediate goal of the incursion. They have also served Russian interests by aiding the Abkhaz and weakening the Georgians, whose pro-Western policies had been a thorn in Russia's side. They have also answered the Western--largely American--support of Kosovan independence, which was strongly opposed by Russia. So, Russian interests have been served.
But they have been served in a ham-handed, blustering, domineering manner that has alarmed the West and the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Russians have drawn attention to their grievances, but at some cost. How much, we don't know.
American policy has been less than perfect. It is not true that "the U.S. had encouraged Georgia to attack the autonomous region of South Ossetia," an accusation made by Putin. Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried discouraged the Georgians from actions in South Ossetia that would antagonize the Russians more than once. If the Georgians were listening, they would have known that the United States would not provide military support if the Russians attacked.
Yet it seems clear in retrospect that the Georgians were not discouraged strongly enough. Military aid was provided, but with too few strings. Political support was given with too little recognition of the limitations of Georgian democracy (see the ICG report, "Georgia: Sliding towards Authoritarianism?").
So what happens now? The Russians have made it clear that they will not return to the status quo ante. They have earned a chill in relations with the West. Georgia must be provided with aid and support. At the same time, their mistakes must be recognized and the danger that their recklessness poses to Western interests must be factored into policy.
In the bigger picture, Russia and the United States need to find a way of dealing with each other as neither enemies nor friends and as equals in the region. That is not natural to either country. Both countries have historically been most comfortable treating the outside world in binary terms. The Russians tend to see other countries as either enemies or subordinates; the Americans tend to see them as either enemies or friends. A middle ground will be hard come by.
In the longer term, Russian power will shrink. It is, in fact, at its apogee. In the coming decades, Russian production of oil and natural gas will prove to be a wasting asset as the rest of the world, the West in particular, finds alternative sources of energy and uses energy more efficiently. In addition, the Russian population is aging and shrinking. There is as yet little sign that anything in the Russian economy will make up for the decline in economic growth that these two trends suggest we will see.
One last point. The commentary on the crisis in Georgia usually skipped any discussion of the people at the center of the conflict. What will happen to the Ossetians? What will happen to the Abkhaz? The Russians are promising them their independence. But it seems all too likely that they will be swallowed, de facto or de jure, into a Russia that views all the Caucasian peoples with suspicion. They are throwing the Georgians out, even their Georgian neighbors. In the end, however, they may be the biggest losers, eternally dependent on a Russia that views them as merely a means to other ends.
The truth is that like most conflicts, this one is more complex than a cursory glance through the headline suggests. The initial reaction of most people in the United States--and my own--was that the Russians had attacked the Georgians with no provocation, merely to further their own ambitions in the Caucasus. McCain announced that "We are all Georgians." Commentators everywhere echoed such thoughts. Saakashvili was omnipresent in the media, making his vehemently in English.
I was struck by the vehemence of the reaction by Russians--not the Russian government, but Russians like Gorbachev and others writing in the American press. The insisted strongly that their country had acted correctly and in defense of a helpless people, the Ossetians.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) can be counted on to present a sophisticated understanding of such issues. Indeed, they have done so with their analyses of the conflicts in Georgia. The Georgians were far from blameless. The conflict might have arisen if President Gamsakhurdia had not ended the autonomy of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in 1991. Since then, after a hard-fought civil war, the Georgians have made no effort to reincorporate either the Ossetians or the Abkhaz into Georgia. These minorities have followed a basic principle of international relations--the enemy of my enemy is my friend. So they have leaned on Russia for protection.
The Georgians could have made an effort to wean these peoples away from their protector. They did quite the opposite and, in the end, miscalculated badly by attacking the Ossetians. Thus the Russian counterattack.
That was where some Western commentators left the story (for example, Paul Craig Roberts, whose purposely provocative commentary in Counterpunch is both scurrilous and profoundly ignorant). So, too, did some of the Russians I had read, though their criticisms were often thoughtful.
The Russians, however, were pushing interests that in a different era could have been labelled imperialist. Earlier in 2008 they made a series of political, diplomatic, and military moves that strengthened their support of the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (See the ICG Report "Georgia and Russia: Clashing over Abkhazia"). The Georgians responded with their own provocations. Finally, on August 7, they invaded Tskhinvali. The speed and strength of the Russian response suggests that they had prepared for such an event.
The Russians have succeeded not just in helping the Ossetians, satisfying the immediate goal of the incursion. They have also served Russian interests by aiding the Abkhaz and weakening the Georgians, whose pro-Western policies had been a thorn in Russia's side. They have also answered the Western--largely American--support of Kosovan independence, which was strongly opposed by Russia. So, Russian interests have been served.
But they have been served in a ham-handed, blustering, domineering manner that has alarmed the West and the states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The Russians have drawn attention to their grievances, but at some cost. How much, we don't know.
American policy has been less than perfect. It is not true that "the U.S. had encouraged Georgia to attack the autonomous region of South Ossetia," an accusation made by Putin. Indeed, Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried discouraged the Georgians from actions in South Ossetia that would antagonize the Russians more than once. If the Georgians were listening, they would have known that the United States would not provide military support if the Russians attacked.
Yet it seems clear in retrospect that the Georgians were not discouraged strongly enough. Military aid was provided, but with too few strings. Political support was given with too little recognition of the limitations of Georgian democracy (see the ICG report, "Georgia: Sliding towards Authoritarianism?").
So what happens now? The Russians have made it clear that they will not return to the status quo ante. They have earned a chill in relations with the West. Georgia must be provided with aid and support. At the same time, their mistakes must be recognized and the danger that their recklessness poses to Western interests must be factored into policy.
In the bigger picture, Russia and the United States need to find a way of dealing with each other as neither enemies nor friends and as equals in the region. That is not natural to either country. Both countries have historically been most comfortable treating the outside world in binary terms. The Russians tend to see other countries as either enemies or subordinates; the Americans tend to see them as either enemies or friends. A middle ground will be hard come by.
In the longer term, Russian power will shrink. It is, in fact, at its apogee. In the coming decades, Russian production of oil and natural gas will prove to be a wasting asset as the rest of the world, the West in particular, finds alternative sources of energy and uses energy more efficiently. In addition, the Russian population is aging and shrinking. There is as yet little sign that anything in the Russian economy will make up for the decline in economic growth that these two trends suggest we will see.
One last point. The commentary on the crisis in Georgia usually skipped any discussion of the people at the center of the conflict. What will happen to the Ossetians? What will happen to the Abkhaz? The Russians are promising them their independence. But it seems all too likely that they will be swallowed, de facto or de jure, into a Russia that views all the Caucasian peoples with suspicion. They are throwing the Georgians out, even their Georgian neighbors. In the end, however, they may be the biggest losers, eternally dependent on a Russia that views them as merely a means to other ends.
30 August 2008
Tax Cuts and Sacrifice
Amid all the good things about Barack Obama's speech to the Democratic National Convention was this sentence:
Unfortunately, for all the concern about the current state of the economy and the problems of the poor and other people less fortunate than most, we do not feel pressed toward improvement. Americans are, by and large, comfortable. Our biggest challenges, it seems to us, are somewhere on the horizon. They don't stare us in the face. Action can be postponed.
What are these challenges? An aging workforce, with many nearing retirement. A crumbling infrastructure. An environment that will change utterly in the next generation. These three things alone will take many billions of dollars of government spending. They will also take personal sacrifice. Yet no one is talking about concrete measures to meet these challenges. Reform of social security and Medicare is off the agenda. The infrastructure is not talked about. Our environmental problems will be taken care of by tax incentives and research, as if something less than a fundamental change in how we live is needed (which it is, in my opinion, but I'll leave that argument for another time).
Obama, on the contrary, talks about new programs that will increase spending. Mind you, McCain and the Republicans are not paragons of fiscal probity. They have their own programs and tax cuts to offer the electorate. They see no more urgent need for us to tighten our belts than the Democrats do.
This shows how important it was that President Bush failed to ask for sacrifice in the wake of 9/11. He squandered a once-in-a-generation opportunity to ask us to act together as a community. The promise of Obama is that he offer us that opportunity again.
There were hints of that in the speech. For example, he suggested that college aid will be offered to those who serve, in the military or in some civilian capacity:
I will--listen now--I will cut taxes--cut taxes--for 95 percent of all working families, because, in an economy like this, the last thing we should do is raise taxes on the middle class.It may be that no candidate can win who promises to raise taxes. It may be that Obama's chances of winning are increased appreciably by promising to lower them. But no president will be able to create the programs needed to meet the challenges this country faces without making Americans pay for them.
Unfortunately, for all the concern about the current state of the economy and the problems of the poor and other people less fortunate than most, we do not feel pressed toward improvement. Americans are, by and large, comfortable. Our biggest challenges, it seems to us, are somewhere on the horizon. They don't stare us in the face. Action can be postponed.
What are these challenges? An aging workforce, with many nearing retirement. A crumbling infrastructure. An environment that will change utterly in the next generation. These three things alone will take many billions of dollars of government spending. They will also take personal sacrifice. Yet no one is talking about concrete measures to meet these challenges. Reform of social security and Medicare is off the agenda. The infrastructure is not talked about. Our environmental problems will be taken care of by tax incentives and research, as if something less than a fundamental change in how we live is needed (which it is, in my opinion, but I'll leave that argument for another time).
Obama, on the contrary, talks about new programs that will increase spending. Mind you, McCain and the Republicans are not paragons of fiscal probity. They have their own programs and tax cuts to offer the electorate. They see no more urgent need for us to tighten our belts than the Democrats do.
This shows how important it was that President Bush failed to ask for sacrifice in the wake of 9/11. He squandered a once-in-a-generation opportunity to ask us to act together as a community. The promise of Obama is that he offer us that opportunity again.
There were hints of that in the speech. For example, he suggested that college aid will be offered to those who serve, in the military or in some civilian capacity:
And we will keep our promise to every young American: If you commit to serving your community or our country, we will make sure you can afford a college education.That statement, with it's hint of new GI bill to reward those who serve, could be a whisper before a shout, a loud call to all of us to join together in common action to renew our country. We need that, rather than a plea to "Enrichez-vous," which the promise to cut taxes evokes. Would Americans respond? The success of the Obama campaign suggests that they might. I wish the answer were clearer, but we won't get it unless the call is made.
29 February 2008
William F. Buckley
William F. Buckley died this week. His absence leaves a gap that even those who do not share his conservatism should feel.
Let me make it clear that I was never a disciple. I never read his books. I disagreed with what was written in The National Review the few times I glanced at it.
But I did watch Firing Line when I was growing up and old enough to care about the arguments that were made. I admired his facility with language. I respected the arguments he made and had to smile when asked just the right question to put his guest on the spot, smiling mischievously as he did. When I did not agree, which was most of the time, I still had to think through why I disagreed. Someone who makes you do that needs to be thanked.
His love of language was palpable. No doubt many found him snobbish and showy because of his penchant for using long, little-known words. The New York Times this week caught his tone beautifully:
His brother Reed once came to Culver Military Academy when I was a cadet. He was much like his brother in politics and language. I remember the evening as one of polite but earnest intellectual sparring. This wasn't Bill, but it felt much as if it were. I loved it.
Firing Line is long gone. And now so is Buckley. There is now no one who can both challenge and entertain us with splendid language and rigorous logic placed at the service of political argument.
Thanks, Bill.
Let me make it clear that I was never a disciple. I never read his books. I disagreed with what was written in The National Review the few times I glanced at it.
But I did watch Firing Line when I was growing up and old enough to care about the arguments that were made. I admired his facility with language. I respected the arguments he made and had to smile when asked just the right question to put his guest on the spot, smiling mischievously as he did. When I did not agree, which was most of the time, I still had to think through why I disagreed. Someone who makes you do that needs to be thanked.
His love of language was palpable. No doubt many found him snobbish and showy because of his penchant for using long, little-known words. The New York Times this week caught his tone beautifully:
"Mr. Buckley marshaled polysyllabic exuberance and a refined, perspicacious mind to elevate conservatism to the center of American political discourse."Yet I read once that he chose words precisely. To him, not just any word would do; it had to fit the meaning he intended perfectly, or close to it. That is a precept I have tried to follow when writing. I confess that I owe the attitude to him. His words were showy and pyrotechnic. But they were pyrotechnics with a purpose and a love for the sheer sound they produced. If such language is a vice, it is easily forgiven.
His brother Reed once came to Culver Military Academy when I was a cadet. He was much like his brother in politics and language. I remember the evening as one of polite but earnest intellectual sparring. This wasn't Bill, but it felt much as if it were. I loved it.
Firing Line is long gone. And now so is Buckley. There is now no one who can both challenge and entertain us with splendid language and rigorous logic placed at the service of political argument.
Thanks, Bill.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)