Secretary Rice is trying to get what she calls a lasting settlement in Lebanon. Let us hope she succeeds. But the settlement she describes is too narrow to be lasting.
The settlement she is aiming for would place an "international Stabilization Force" on the border between Lebanon and Israel. It would allow the Lebanese government to extend its authority to that border, prohibit "armed groups," i.e., Hezbollah, and foreign forces, i.e., Syrian troops, where the Stabilization Force is deployed, and enforce an embargo against weapons delivered anyone other than the Lebanese government or the international force. The international force would also help the Lebanese patrol the border with Syria.
This reflects the decision not to talk to those we oppose. In her statement Rice repeatedly says that the "Lebanon, Israel, and the international community agree..." on the points she makes. The entire statement is clearly aimed at Hezbollah and Syria. There are no carrots that might induce them to abide by it; the expectation seems to be that the international force would be a deterrent strong enough to prevent any challenge.
But it cannot be. Hezbollah is proving itself strong as an armed force; it is gaining political strength as the only Arab force that has been effective against Israel. Should Israel succeed in diminishing Hezbollah's military force, Hezbollah will strive to reconstitute it. Syria and Iran will help with the blessing, open or covert, of mush of the rest of the Arab world. The war will continue at some later time.
Moreover, there is little in the proposed settlement to help the Lebanese government. Support is declared for it; vague promises of help from the international force are given. But nowhere is there an assurance of concrete support that will help this weak state become strong. Indeed, the actions of both Israel and Hezbollah have weakened it, and it is quite possible that the presence of an international force will merely underline how weak the government is.
Let us hope that this minimal settlement can be reached. Do not attach high hopes to it. A lasting settlement will require harder work than the United States is currently prepared to do. It will require that all the actors be engaged, including those we would like to simply disappear.
31 July 2006
24 July 2006
Talk to the Bad Guys
After writing the previous entry ("America, Deaf and Dumb," 23 July 2006), I saw the following paragraph in an op-ed piece by John McLaughlin in The Washington Post. McLaughlin was deputy director of the CIA during the first Bush administration:
I would go a step further than McLaughlin: Not talking to bad guys weakens us. It reduces the number of options we have available because of the difficulties of communicating anything. Options are increased when you and your interlocuteur know what you both think is important. When your options are reduced, the chances that you will find a satisfactory resolution to a problem are reduced as well.
"...even superpowers have to talk to bad guys. The absence of a diplomatic relationship with Iran and the deterioration of the one with Syria -- two countries that bear enormous responsibility for the current crisis -- leave the United States with fewer options and levers than might otherwise have been the case. Distasteful as it might have been to have or to maintain open and normal relations with such states, the absence of such relations ensures that we will have more blind spots than we can afford and that we will have to deal through surrogates on issues of vital importance to the United States. We will have to get over the notion that talking to bad guys somehow rewards them or is a sign of weakness. As a superpower, we ought to be able to communicate in a way that signals our strength and self-confidence."
I would go a step further than McLaughlin: Not talking to bad guys weakens us. It reduces the number of options we have available because of the difficulties of communicating anything. Options are increased when you and your interlocuteur know what you both think is important. When your options are reduced, the chances that you will find a satisfactory resolution to a problem are reduced as well.
23 July 2006
America, Deaf and Dumb
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, at this writing, is on her way to the Middle East to try to deal with the situation in Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah are fighting. Foreigners are evacuating the country. Almost 400 civilians have been killed. Israel is threatening to invade.
Secretary Rice will talk to the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Saudis. But she will not talk to the Syrians or the Iranians. We have diplomatic relations with neither country. We have forfeited our direct influence on both sides of the conflict. In so doing, we have, by choice, diminished our power.
It was not always thus. We have always been wary of Syria and aware of the nature of the regime. Yet Kissinger went to Damascus and to reach an agreement that helped Israel. In contrast, now, we rely on others. This is weakness, shown by shown by Bush's comment in St. Petersburg, caught when he thought the mike was turned off: “I felt like telling Kofi to get on the phone with Assad and make something happen." He cannot call Assad himself--by choice, neither nor any other senior administration official has a relationship with the Syrian leader. Indeed, as far as is known, we must rely on other countries or the media to relay the simplest message to either Syria or Iran. We cannot negotiate, we cannot warn, except through others.
This unwillingness to talk has been characteristic of the Bush administration. When the question of direct talks with Korea or Iran has come up, we have curtly refused, time and again. An administration that insists on its duty to take unilateral action insists on the need to hold only multilateral talks.
There seem to be two reasons for this. First, the administration believes that direct talks give legitimacy to its enemies. The President seems to equate talking to a foreign regime with supporting it, as if American relations with Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, and Hitler's Germany meant that we somehow approved of those regimes. The administrations' characterization of these two countries as irresponsible supporters of extremists, of terrorists, is close to the mark, but surely we would gain, in our knowledge of these countries, if nothing else, by having channels of communication readily available.
Second, the administration doesn't want to engage in mere talk. This is akin to a long-standing distrust of diplomats and their role held by many. It is true that talk can be cheap. But is also a way of opening or keeping open a communications channel that can at the least prevent misunderstanding. It can also lead to the satisfaction of mutual interests, which even countries that regard each other as enemies can have.
A result of this is that in the conflicts in Lebanon and with Iran and Korea, we have been curiously passive. We look for others to make the phone calls, to carry our water. We seem to pray for a miracle of regime change so that we can avoid the hard choices that dealing with these problems will entail.
Secretary Rice will talk to the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Saudis. But she will not talk to the Syrians or the Iranians. We have diplomatic relations with neither country. We have forfeited our direct influence on both sides of the conflict. In so doing, we have, by choice, diminished our power.
It was not always thus. We have always been wary of Syria and aware of the nature of the regime. Yet Kissinger went to Damascus and to reach an agreement that helped Israel. In contrast, now, we rely on others. This is weakness, shown by shown by Bush's comment in St. Petersburg, caught when he thought the mike was turned off: “I felt like telling Kofi to get on the phone with Assad and make something happen." He cannot call Assad himself--by choice, neither nor any other senior administration official has a relationship with the Syrian leader. Indeed, as far as is known, we must rely on other countries or the media to relay the simplest message to either Syria or Iran. We cannot negotiate, we cannot warn, except through others.
This unwillingness to talk has been characteristic of the Bush administration. When the question of direct talks with Korea or Iran has come up, we have curtly refused, time and again. An administration that insists on its duty to take unilateral action insists on the need to hold only multilateral talks.
There seem to be two reasons for this. First, the administration believes that direct talks give legitimacy to its enemies. The President seems to equate talking to a foreign regime with supporting it, as if American relations with Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, and Hitler's Germany meant that we somehow approved of those regimes. The administrations' characterization of these two countries as irresponsible supporters of extremists, of terrorists, is close to the mark, but surely we would gain, in our knowledge of these countries, if nothing else, by having channels of communication readily available.
Second, the administration doesn't want to engage in mere talk. This is akin to a long-standing distrust of diplomats and their role held by many. It is true that talk can be cheap. But is also a way of opening or keeping open a communications channel that can at the least prevent misunderstanding. It can also lead to the satisfaction of mutual interests, which even countries that regard each other as enemies can have.
A result of this is that in the conflicts in Lebanon and with Iran and Korea, we have been curiously passive. We look for others to make the phone calls, to carry our water. We seem to pray for a miracle of regime change so that we can avoid the hard choices that dealing with these problems will entail.
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