06 September 2006

Our Absolute Enemy: Iran

In his speech about terrorism to the Military Officers Association of America, President Bush equated Iran with Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. That is a futile and dangerous equation.

He quotes Iranian President Ahmadinejad several times. The rhetoric is, indeed, chilling. Ahmadinejad wishes us the worst. And the evidence that Iran has supported Hezbollah and other terrorists is, from all indications, overwhelming. Do not doubt it.

But the problem is, what can we do? We already have sanctions against Iran. We never reestablished diplomatic relations after the hostages were seized in 1979. We are moving to get a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have other countries join us in imposing sanctions. Yet that seems destined to fail because of objections to it by the Russians and Chinese. In short, we have little leverage. There is almost nothing we can do, short of applying military force, that can impel the Iranian government to change its course.

And let’s not get into the use of military force. The chances of its being effective are low; the odds that it will be counterproductive are high.

So what can we do? There is not much that we can do that will be effective in the short run. In the longer run, however, Iran will change. We must begin to establish a framework for relations that a more moderate, less antagonistic Iran can grow into. That means finding ways to open a dialogue, so that when Iran is ready to talk seriously about having good relations with us, it will be easy to reply.

These new channels of communication can be formal or informal, public or private. A key element is that it understood by the Iranians that their messages will be heard by the U.S. government.

A benefit of opening such channels is that they can make it easier for Iran to step back from confrontation with us, if they are so inclined. They can be a small carrot to go along with the wet noodle we are calling a stick.