In brief, the administration needs to adopt a different course. The current one is unsustainable. Dennis Ross outlined an alternative in this morning's Washington Post that may offer the best hope for a reasonable outcome.
An important first step is to recognize that our ultimate aim--a stable, prosperous, democratic Iraq that can serve as an example for the rest of the region--cannot be reached in the short run or while we are are enmeshed in the conflicts in Iraq. The goals that Ross believes can be reached are much more limited:
Iraq could, in the best case, evolve into a country that has the following: a central government with limited powers; provincial governments with extensive autonomy; sharing of oil revenue; and, at the local level, some rough form of representation and tolerance for minorities. In those circumstances Iraq might eventually achieve stability.
To achieve them, Ross proposes three sets of negotiations. The results of all are interwoven: one will affect the others. Success in any of them is far from assured.
One is between the United States and the Maliki government over a timetable for withdrawal. The alternative here is simply the unilateral declaration of a deadline for getting our troops out. Given that Iraqi's want us out in any case, this is a way to let them take responsibility for their country. All parties in the government can help shape the conditions under which our troops leave. As the Unite States has never intended to stay in Iraq in force in perpetuity, such negotiations can also reaffirm our intention to leave Iraq to the Iraqis.
Another is a national reconciliation conference among the parties in Iraq. The adoption of the constitution left several issues unresolved--notably the right of secession and whether and how to share oil revenue. These and other issues dividing Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites need to be discussed and resolved in negotiations that, unlike to talks over the constitution, have no firm deadline.
These negotiations may be the most difficult of the three. Are there spokesmen for all three groups with enough authority to ensure that the results they approve win enough acceptance to stop the violence? At this distance, we cannot say.
The third set of negotiations is a regional conference of the countries that are most affected by the violence in Iraq and that will bear the brunt of the consequences of American withdrawal: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Perhaps Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates should be included as well.
An effort like this should have been made some time ago. The American intervention in Iraq cannot succeed with the opposition of these countries; the chances of its success increase exponentially if they help.
A major stumbling block to this conference is the reluctance of the Bush administration to talk to Syria and Iran. That must be overcome. And for the conference to succeed in getting these countries to participate in efforts that can make Iraq stable, the administration must show understanding, flexibility, patience, and imagination that are always in short supply.
As that suggests, this conference, like the other two sets of negotiations, is a long shot. But failure is not preordained. As of now, no alternative seems better. Particularly "Stay the Course."
