Dual-Track Politics?

Two points made by Mahan Abedin in the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor suggest that progress has been made in Iraq, but suggest that the future maybe more complex than many seem to anticipate. First, he calls the political process that has centered on elections "irreversible." That seems optimistic, but it is certainly plausible, given the growing participation of all parties, especially the Sunnis. All parties, save Zarqawi's jihadists, seem to believe that they have a stake in the formation of the new Iraqi government.

The other point is allied to this. To quote Abedin:

There is already evidence that the Arab Sunni political parties coordinated their electoral strategy with several insurgent organizations. Indeed several insurgent groups have called for a ceasefire during the elections, and virtually the entire “nationalist” insurgency (save for a few hardcore Ba’athists) was in favor of Arab Sunni participation in the elections.

Abedin suggests that the insurgents may try to follow a sort of dual-track politics. They will use a combination of violence and political means to gain their ends. The election made this possible, as the quote suggests, by giving the insurgents a voice in the political process through Sunni parties like those that make up the Iraqi Accord Front. This voice can help both to legitimize the insurgency and to add pressure on the Americans to leave. While, Abedin argues, Moqtada El-Sadr has been co-opted by the political process, other Shiite groups may adopt a similar dual-track strategy.

This does not diminish the threat of civil war. Indeed, the success of religious parties in the election may have increased it. Iraqis seem bent on factionalism, which the infant political system may not be able to contain.

Moreover, there is no figure comparable to Mandela or Kenyatta in the insurgency--a widely respected nationalist who could unite the country should the insurgents succeed in gaining political power. That is one more unfortunate result of Zarqawi's success in becoming the public face of the anti-American forces in Iraq. And yet El-Sadr might become such a figure, if he can reach out to the Sunnis (and the Kurds) as Mandela was able to reach out across the color lines in South Africa.