Dual-Track Politics?

Two points made by Mahan Abedin in the Jamestown Foundation's Terrorism Monitor suggest that progress has been made in Iraq, but suggest that the future maybe more complex than many seem to anticipate. First, he calls the political process that has centered on elections "irreversible." That seems optimistic, but it is certainly plausible, given the growing participation of all parties, especially the Sunnis. All parties, save Zarqawi's jihadists, seem to believe that they have a stake in the formation of the new Iraqi government.

The other point is allied to this. To quote Abedin:

There is already evidence that the Arab Sunni political parties coordinated their electoral strategy with several insurgent organizations. Indeed several insurgent groups have called for a ceasefire during the elections, and virtually the entire “nationalist” insurgency (save for a few hardcore Ba’athists) was in favor of Arab Sunni participation in the elections.

Abedin suggests that the insurgents may try to follow a sort of dual-track politics. They will use a combination of violence and political means to gain their ends. The election made this possible, as the quote suggests, by giving the insurgents a voice in the political process through Sunni parties like those that make up the Iraqi Accord Front. This voice can help both to legitimize the insurgency and to add pressure on the Americans to leave. While, Abedin argues, Moqtada El-Sadr has been co-opted by the political process, other Shiite groups may adopt a similar dual-track strategy.

This does not diminish the threat of civil war. Indeed, the success of religious parties in the election may have increased it. Iraqis seem bent on factionalism, which the infant political system may not be able to contain.

Moreover, there is no figure comparable to Mandela or Kenyatta in the insurgency--a widely respected nationalist who could unite the country should the insurgents succeed in gaining political power. That is one more unfortunate result of Zarqawi's success in becoming the public face of the anti-American forces in Iraq. And yet El-Sadr might become such a figure, if he can reach out to the Sunnis (and the Kurds) as Mandela was able to reach out across the color lines in South Africa.

Elections in Iraq

The Iraqi elections seem to have turned out well for everyone but the hard-core insurgents. Turnout was high, even in Sunni areas, and violence was low.

The most remarkable thing was that the insurgents not only did not try to disrupt the elections, in parts of Iraq they even posted guards at polling stations. The Guardian, among other sources, reported on this:

In Ramadi, a centre of armed resistance to the US occupation, masked gunmen guarded polling stations in Ramadi. "The mujahedin were at the polling station urging us not to let our voice be split. They urged us to go for either of the two Sunni lists, the Consensus Front or Saleh al-Mutlaq," said Ali Abed al-Dulaimi, a retired car salesman, in a telephone interview. Both lists, one Islamist, one secular, claim to have links with the nationalist gunmen.

No doubt there was some intimidation there. There can be little doubt, too, that there were irregularities in the election. But even the insurgents seem to believe that their aims can be served through representation in the newly elected government. And Zarqawi's decision to stand aside and let the vote happen is one more indication that sentiment favoring elections was strong. As if actions were not enough.

Elections alone do not a democracy make, and while the success of this is promising, all three groups of Iraqis--the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds--must perceive that the government that will be formed can serve their needs adequately. Given the agendas of the Kurds and the Shiites and the strength they will probably have when the new government is formed, this perception may be difficult to achieve. Moreover, the insurgency, with its irreconcilable, Zarqawi-led kernel, and the need--ever paramount--for all in Iraq to feel secure will create their own difficulties for the new government and the United States.

Fortunately, the elections left those inclined toward peace stronger.

We Will Withdraw, Like It or Not

The Times has published a story that reports that American and British troops will leave Iraq soon after the new government is sworn in. The story says that will be as early as March and that the number of American troops may fall below 100,000 "in the coming months." The sources seem to be both American and British.

This is one more sign that the apparent hard-line against withdrawal taken by President Bush and others is softer than it appears. Political reality is pushing us toward withdrawal.

Two other points of the article are worth noting as they point to dangers that withdrawal may bring. The first is the protestation of Iraqi authorities that premature withdrawal may, first, increase the risk of intervention by Iraq's neighbors (primarily Iran and Turkey, though those two countries are not named) and, second, "encourage the rise of militias, leading to sectarian strife and the settling of old scores."

The second point worth noting is a poll the BBC conducted in Iraq. Only 10 percent of those responding thought that American withdrawal should have a high priority for the new government. Indeed, the Times concludes: "The public has doubts about the ability of the Iraqi security forces, in particular the police, which is riddled with militia, and the army, which lacks equipment, training and leadership." Others have different opinions about the results of the poll.

The poll results do show the respondents to be optimistic about the future. Moreover, when asked about what would be the best thing that could happen to Iraq in the next year, less than 6 percent said it would be with withdrawal of American troops. Security was named by a third and peace and stability were named by another fifth. A question about priorities also showed that an increase in security ranked far higher than the removal of foreign troops. In answer to a question about when the coalition forces should leave Iraq, only a quarter said they should leave now. More than that said they should leave when stability is restored. On the other hand, only an infinitesimal number are eager for American troops to stay and well more than half oppose the presence of coalition forces.

A successful withdrawal is predicated on the Iraqi forces improving, becoming much better than they currently appear. The poll and the concerns of the Iraqi authorities underline the dangers of leaving too quickly. While national feeling remains strong, there may be an important role for American troops until Iraqis feel secure.

A question few seem to ask is how long and in what strength the United States should remain in Iraq. An allied question is whether the Iraqi public can accept a large, extended deployment. The BBC poll suggests that they may. If we want a secure, peaceful Iraq, we may have to. Those who cite the model of Japan and Germany after World War II should remember that we only left Japan after 5 years (and retained extensive basing rights) and that we still remain in Germany.

Timetables

The disagreement over timetables reflects a failure of imagination. This is too often true in public disputes over policy. The Democrats are urging the President to simply pull troops out according to a strict timetable, with the moderates simplifying lengthening the time. The President digs in his heels and says "No."

This serves nobody. There are real benefits that a timetable for withdrawal can give us, by making it clearer to the players in Iraq and the region that the United States will withdraw. I doubt that anyone truly believes that the United States will not withdraw, given the falling support for the war in Iraq. SO the President is gaining little by being stubborn.

But why not set a timetable linked to milestones? These could be accomplishments of the Iraqi government--number of troops trained; number of units reaching certain levels of accomplishment. Some of the discussion by officials in the administration has suggested linking the withdrawal of troops to such measures, anyway. Other milestones could be economic accomplishments--these could be linked to other measures. They could also be successful actions of the insurgents: for example, if incidents across the country or in certain provinces fall below a given number, then troops can go home. An advantage of a milestone like that is that it puts part of the onus for the continuing presence of American troops on the insurgents. That could be a weapon to use against reconcilable elements among them.

Senator Kerry has proposed something like this, linking withdrawal to "benchmarks" like this month's elections. But he still has the goal of withdrawing "the bulk of American combat forces by the end of next year." That makes the deadline too certain and, as the Administration will point out, gives the insurgents notice that they simply have to wait for the Americans to leave.

A more imaginative, subtle approach might help the administration out the trap into which it is falling by trying to hold firm to a policy that is becoming unsustainable owing to changes in American public opinion.

Wesley Clark on Iraq

In this morning's New York Times, Wesley Clark, the former commander on NATO forces who had a brief fling as presidential candidate in 2004, presents his plan for Iraq. Much of it makes sense. Much of his analysis is focused on Iran, which he and his interlocutors in the Arab World see as the big winner in Iraq. I have read elsewhere that the Iraqi Shiites are by no means as taken with Iran as others feel, but we should work to minimize the influence of Iran in Iraq. One distressing result of a civil war could well be the creation of an Iranian satellite state centered on Basra.

Two other things are noteworthy. First, his critique of other approaches on the table:

"Staying the course" risks a slow and costly departure of American forces with Iraq increasingly factionalized and aligned with Iran. Yet a more rapid departure of American troops along a timeline, as some Democrats are calling for, simply reduces our ability to affect the outcome and risks broader regional conflict.

Note that he has both the Administration and the Democrats advocating departure, only at different speeds. The President is not saying that, but as a matter of practical politics, he may soon have to begin a slow withdrawal.

Second, he advocates a stronger effort to co-opt the insurgents, a bigger carrot to go along with a solid stick:

...these efforts must go hand-in-glove with intensified outreach to Iraqi insurgents, to seek their reassimilation into society and their assistance in wiping out residual foreign jihadists. Iraqi and American officials have had sporadic communications with insurgent leaders, but these must lead to deeper discussions on issues like amnesty for insurgents who lay down their arms and opportunities for their further participation in public and private life.

As I said before, some of the decisions necessary to make such a policy effective will not be easy to make ("...amnesty for insurgents...."?), but this offers a course toward becoming effective on the ground that seems more likely to be successful than what we are doing now.

Games, Viruses, and Our Experiment Life

The world of malware--worms, viruses, and the like--is changing. Once the loner teen wrote the bad code while burning the midnight oil, soaking in Mountain Dew. Now it is becoming a commercial enterprise and the bad guys are becoming more professional. The threats are becoming more sophisticated. This entry by Eugene in the weblog of Kaspersky Labs has some interesting observations about this:

Once upon a time, back when everyone knew why a "floppy disk" was "floppy", computers were not completely Windows-ized, and the black screen of DOS was the standard "desktop", virus writers were just kids who happened to write viruses. They did it for fun, to assert themselves, to hit their friends and neighbours systems, or to get revenge on the world at large. They wrote some very silly viruses, and some very complicated viruses. They used different kinds of infection and stealth technologies, and there were lot of these "true" viruses - I remember a time when we were adding about 100 records per week to our antivirus database updates.

And now most malicious code is "commercial" - it's designed to control infected networks and/or earn money (see more at the beginning of this article. In among these programs, we still find "true" viruses and Trojans. But surprise! Not as many as in the past. Looking at our statistics, I see that we are now adding less than 10 "true" viruses and Trojan programs a week - ten times less than ten years ago. Does this mean that virus writers have stopped creating "true" viruses? Yes. But why? The situation should be totally the opposite - there are more and more teenagers getting access to computers, so shouldn't there be more and more "true" viruses written by them?

I think increased access to computers is actually the reason why the number of "true" viruses is decreasing. The fact is teenagers don't have time for writing viruses - they're busy playing online games.

They can assert their personality, they can create their own worlds, and destroy the existing one. They can find real friends, and "kill" virtual enemies in their virtual worlds. They attack and protect. They don't need extra proof anymore.

So - the kids have left the world of "true" virus writing. This was a world which had bad, sometimes very bad, consequences, but sometimes it lead to the creation of technically interesting or sophisticated programs. In moving out of this world, they stopped training their brains by developing their own virtual creatures - now they're lost in the virtual underworld of online computer games.

Is this good or bad, for us and for them? I don't know. My colleague Teodor Cimpoesu, from KL Romania, has also had some thoughts about this:

"People might think that it's good for the AV vendors if virus writers produce malicious programs, and the more numerous and more complex, the better. This is one point of view.

From a security point of view, less complex viruses mean easier intervention. But with serious virus writers moving into the commercial arena, it looks like we may start to see more complex business malware soon - and then the AV industry may end up playing a significant role in blocking or breaking cybercrime.

Most of the social effects of video games, when we come to understand them, are unlikely to be so beneficial. Unfortunately, we hardly know what they are. As has often happened, technology has thrown us into the middle of a social experiment. We may know the outcome twenty or thirty years from now. If we are wise enough to recognize it. But do we really know how television has changed us? Or how radio and the movies changed our parents? In truth, we lose context and become unable to compare our own experience with pervasive technologies like radio and television with that of others who have not had them. This can be a challenge for sociology.

Withdrawal from Iraq?

The withdrawal of American troops from Iraq is now on the table. Rep. Jack Murtha and some Democrats favor a complete withdrawal immediately. Senator Russell Feingold has called for one in a year. Senators Kerry and Biden and more Democrats support a partial withdrawal. There a three rationales for a withdrawal, aside from any wish to simply disengage from a war that they (and this writer) view as a mistake. The first, which Murtha suggests, is that if we leave, the Iraqis will be forced to step up to the plate to defend themselves. Murtha assumes that, just as the ill-trained colonists were able to defeat the professional Redcoats after 1776, so the ill-trained Iraqis will find the strength and skill to defeat the insurgents.

The second rationale is that much of the insurgency is fueled by the presence of American troops. The third is that the insurgency gains strength because of the sense that the Americans will never leave. The second and third rationales are linked. A complete withdrawal, of course, addresses both. A partial withdrawal (and a timetable, for that matter), provides hope that the Americans will soon be on their way out and so indirectly addresses the second rationale.

The Administration opposes a withdrawal largely on the grounds that it would send a wrong message to both our allies and our enemies in Iraq and in the rest of the Middle East.

Any proposal for a withdrawal makes assumptions about the capabilities of Iraqi forces that will not be addressed here, aside from noting that those who favor withdrawal tend to optimistic at the same time that many of them criticize the Administration for being ineffective in training the Iraqi forces and the Administration is pessimistic while arguing that the training is effective. We cannot now know which side is right. We can only guess.

Another interesting set of assumptions on both sides, however, is about the message that a withdrawal sends. Or, rather, messages, because different groups will, in fact, get different messages if our troops leave. This is a case where both sides of an argument are correct. The difference is really about whose point will prove to be the more significant.

There are five possible audiences within the Arab world listening to sounds. We will leave aside the greater Middle East, Europe, and the American electorate, all of whom have their ears cocked to catch any words uttered about withdrawal, as the discussion about a withdrawal is focused on its consequences for American policy in Iraq. The insurgents, of course, who can be divided into the irreconcilable foreigners and the domestic insurgents (see my last two posts for more on divisions within the insurgency), and lastly, the Iraqi people who do not actively oppose us. The last group can assuredly be subdivided as well, but we will avoid that complication here.

The President asserted in his speech in Annapolis that a withdrawal or a timetable to withdraw "will encourage the terrorists, it will confuse the Iraqi people." There can be little doubt about the first part of this formulation, particularly if they do not fear the Iraqi security forces. Almost assuredly, they do not now fear them. The second part, confusing the Iraqi people, is curious. Rather than describe a departure as abandoning our friends, he describes consequences that are somewhat less serious. Why? At least part of it has to be that he does not want to suggest that the Iraqi security forces are not on the verge of becoming able to hold their own against the opposition. It might also be that he is holding open the possibility of a change in position. After all, important forces in Iraq have been calling for a timetable for withdrawal. Moqtada El-Sadr is one. The Cairo conference, held last month under the auspices of the Arab League is another. Negotiating a timetable for withdrawal with the government that will be elected on December 15 would have benefits for both sides--it would help legitimate the Iraqis and help the Administration lead us out of an increasingly unpopular war. A timetable created under such circumstances need not cause confusion in Iraq.

President Bush minimizes the effects that a withdrawal will have on the Iraqi people; those who favor one focus on those effects almost exclusively. All who favor withdrawal see the American presence in Iraq as a source of anger among Iraqis that helps to fill the ranks of the insurgency. An American withdrawal, therefore, far from sowing confusion among Iraqis will, they argue, make it clear to the Iraqi people and, perhaps, the domestic insurgents that the current government is legitimate. The insurgency would then weaken; the irreconcilables would be defeated and fade away.

These are not their terms, of course, and I may be suggesting an argument that the proponents of withdrawal do not make. Nonetheless, if seems to follow easily from what they say. If the withdrawal did not help legitimate the government, then its collapse and either anarchy or the victory of the insurgents must follow. No one suggests that.

Murtha. Kerry, and others make the additional argument that with the Americans gone, our Iraqi allies would become more effective. If you favor withdrawal and are concerned about the subsequent outcome in Iraq, you must believe that the legitimacy and effectiveness of our Iraqi allies will increase, at least relative to those of the insurgents. That is the bottom line, and neither legitimacy nor effectiveness can be assumed.

Yet that is close to what many of the proponents of withdrawal do. Murtha, Kerry, and others make assertions about what will happen. They argue based on historical precedent and experience, but much of what they say amounts to a leap in the dark. The failure of the president to come with a timeline of some kind for withdrawing from Iraq seems increasingly untenable politically. Yet the case for withdrawing is not tied to a strong case that a withdrawal will do anything but weaken our allies. A decision will soon be made that will engender costs to be borne. Let us hope they are seen clearly.

Iraq: Presidential Distinctions

A key element of President Bush's speech on Iraq at the Naval Academy was the distinction he made between parts of the Iraqi insurgency. He was echoing the National Security Council's National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. Indeed, much of his speech came verbatim from that document.

The three parts are the Rejectionists, the Saddamists, and the Terrorists, in descending order of reconcilability. The President seemed to suggest what my previous blog entry indicated might prove useful, a strategy to divide the insurgency and to coopt its reconcilable, Iraqi-born elements.

There are three points to make here. First, an effective strategy of cooption will mean that hard choices must sometimes be made. It has to be a carrot and stick policy: in war, sticks are easy to wield, easy to justify, because a war is easiest to conduct when it is done in black and white. Carrots are harder to use if you are not offering your opponent only a chance to surrender because they suggest that the opposition includes grays as well as black. Second, I hope that intelligence analysts have found that "Saddamists" is a meaningful category in how the insurgents think of themselves. The category may prove counterproductive in policy if we refuse to offer former Baathists a chance to change sides. That kind of thinking--equating members of the Baathist Party with hard-core supporters of Saddam, led to some of our most grievous mistakes in Iraq, when we forbade Baathists to hold position in the new government and when we dissolved the Iraqi army. Both errors filled the ranks of the insurgency.

The third point is about the President's rhetoric. In his speech, after introducing the terms for the segmentation of the opposition, he seemed to reserve "Terrorists" for Zarqawi and the irreconcilable foreigners who have infiltrated Iraq. This rhetorical distinction would be welcome if he holds to it, for it suggests that the "War on Terror" is being limited, at least in Iraq. But this may or may not prove significant. Rhetoric that recognizes subtle distinctions had not been characteristic of the Administration. Or its opponents, for that matter.