State, Defense, and the Uzbeks

The Washington Post this morning had an article about a division between the Pentagon and the Department of State over whether to press for an investigation of the recent events in Uzbekistan. Karimov's post-Soviet dictatorship shot hundreds of protesters. State supported tough language in a NATO communique favoring an investigation; Defense opposed it. Defense won.

Both departments have since said that there is no disagreement between them over what to do in Uzbekistan. That is probably true in the sense that both oppose dictatorship, both would like an investiagation of some kind. Nonetheless, we should not doubt that disagreement exists. Indeed, there should be one, because we face choices there that are not easy to make. Rumsfeld was paraphrased as saying that "the Uzbekistan situation had direct implications on NATO operations in the region." He's right. It has implications not just for NATO (in Afghanistan), but the for the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, not just in that region, but throughout the world.

What it comes down to is that there is a conflict between our goal of fostering democracy wherever it springs up and our desire to succeed in political conflicts that we have become embroiled in. This is not a new dilemma for the United States, but decades, perhaps centuries old. It gets to the heart of the ambitions of President Bush as he seeks to leave a legacy that is somewhat greater than a failed war and missing weapons in Iraq.

Rumsfeld noted that our air base in Uzbekistan--jeopardized by efforts to put pressure on President Karimov--is used to transport humanitarian aid (to Afghanistan and elsewhere). That base, made available at some cost to Karimov in his relationship with Russia, has been a key part of our efforts in the region. Were Karimov to forbid us to use it, alternatives would be difficult to find and expensive to use. The support they made possible might also be less effective. In short, opposing Karimov openly and strongly has its costs.

But there are clear costs on the other side as well. These will be especially high if, as I believe, President Bush is sincere, earnest, and determined in his efforts to bring democracy to Iraq and elsewhere in the Muslim world. It is incontestable that he seeks an Iraq that is strong enough and popular enough for American troops to leave with a sense that they--we--have laid a foundation that will make it possible for Iraq to become a prosperous country with a lasting, democratic government.

Yet a weak reaction to Karimov will undermine Bush's efforts. Our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are now less military than political. Indeed, while our stage may be in those countries, the audience extends across the Arab world, into the broader Muslim world, and beyond. If we play a realpolitical game in Central Asia, the rest of the Muslim world will note that, when push came to shove, narrow interest came before the broader concerns of local, Muslim population. Moreover, Karimov will not last. Age alone will take its toll--Karimov is 67--even if there is no Uzbek equivalent of the rose or orange revolution. What will happen then? I submit that there is no long term value to our interests in Central Asia that anything but a harsh policy toward Karimov can offer.

In short, Bush's aspirations across the southern part of Eurasia are likely to benefit from a policy toward Karimov that does not mince words. Yet these benefits are somewhat speculative: we do not know what will happen in a country and a region that we but dimly understand. The costs of a firm stand opposed to Karimov are clearer. We have faced a similar choice before--with Marcos, the Shah, Pinochet, and others. This time, the costs the dictator threatens seem to weigh less than the possible benefits of opposing him firmly.