The FBI Without a Case (File)

One of the running stories in the Washington area IT industry is the failure of the FBI to develop its Virtual Case File (VCF). This has been a program that the Bureau has been trying to develop for years to replace the paper-based system it has used for decades to handle the mass of evidence collected during investigations. Earlier this spring, Director Mueller fired the contractor, SAIC, and declared the program a failure. Each side has blamed the other. The truth is, though, as in most such disputes, plenty of fault can be found on both sides.

A story in today's Washington Post touched on the VCF case again. The Post was given a copy of a report from the House Appropriations Committee that largely blamed the FBI for the problem. Indeed, some of what the FBI was amazingly bad. For instance, they found 400 flaws in the program a year ago, but did not tell SAIC, because "because it did not want the contractor to think these were the only issues remaining"! Yet the bureau kept SAIC on the contract for another year.

That story led me to write a friend at the Congressional Research Service:

I just read the Post report on the FBI's experience with the VCF. Of course, I haven't seen the report from Congress either, but two conclusions seem clear from the Post's account (and other reports I have read):

1. Basic good practices in software development were not followed. In particular, the FBI failed to set firm requirements early and change them only after consulting with the contractor and getting the contractor's agreement--in writing--to make the changes needed. It was as if you signed with a contractor to build a colonial-style house, then changed it to a ranch half-way through.

2. The contractor did not hold the FBI to its word. It contracted to build one system, then in effect and only implicitly, agreed to build a different one after the requirements changed. It should have been willing to drop the contract rather than allow the FBI to continue as it did. That may be a lot to expect from anyone holding such a big contract, but the costs of doing otherwise--both to its finances and its reputation--are precisely what SAIC is paying.

My friend replied to largely agree with me, though he was easier on SAIC than I am. It would, indeed, be difficult to walk away from the millions of dollars involved, particularly as they were bound up in a cost-plus contract, which can be lucrative indeed. Yet a firm is going to get burned if it does not follow practices universally lauded as good and insist that its client does the same. In this case, as in many others, it is a matter of both sides communicating with each other so that both understand what is needed, what can be done, and what the costs are.

The amazing thing, though, is how often contractors and their clients mess things up in similar ways. Too often, an adversarial relationship is taken on one or both sides. I once worked on a project where the federal contracting officer confided to an associate that one had to keep the contractors under a tight reign. Not shy about his views, he did that within earshot of my program manager.

That seems to be part of what happened here. The FBI was determined to bring SAIC to heel and appears to have treated the firm as inalterably obligated to do as the bureau wished. When it failed to produce, the bureau snapped angrily. SAIC, which played into the Bureau's game, has replied in kind.

The truth is, however, that the two scorpions, caught in the same same bottle, have stung themselves. And so we, who rely on the FBI to do its duty, are stuck with an agency whose agents must still to things the old, hard way.