The Hopes and Dangers of Talking to Teheran

The ambassador to Iraq will meet with Iranian officials sometime in the next several weeks. It's about time. This was a recommendation made by the Iraq Study Group that should have been adopted long ago.

It shows that the administration recognizes that the United States and Iraq may well have common interests in Iraq. It is not in Iran's interests, after all, to have chaos reign on its borders. There is a potential, therefore, for an agreement of some kind, an informal one, perhaps, that would have Iran help make the Maliki government stable rather than undermine it through aid to the militias of its Shiite allies.

Such an agreement is only possible, however. One can hope for it; one cannot expect it. There are three reasons for caution.

First, the talks discussed, if they are held, will be held at a low level with an agenda that has yet to be determined. The question of the agenda is one of the things that has held up talks so far, and the range of issues that divide Iran and the United States is wide. The ambassador, and his Iranian counterparts, one presumes, will have to bow to the dictates of more senior officials. Both the agenda and the seniority of the people at the table (or within earshot of it) can change if the talks continue. The point here is just that they add uncertainty to the matter.

Second, the interests of Iran and the United States are similar, but they are far from congruent. Iran would probably prefer that its Shiite allies rule in Baghdad. The United States should see that a government of all parties in Iraq would be more likely to last. The United States would be less likely to oppose allowing Kurdistan to be strongly autonomous or even independent than Iran would. Iran, after all, does have a significant Kurdish minority. But these are the kinds of things one has talks to find out.

Third, and most important, the United States has to assure the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Sunni states of the Middle East that it will not acquiesce to a government dominated by Iran or its allies. That may be the greatest danger that these talks open up, particularly as the Maliki government has shown on many occasions that it as a proclivity to favor the Shiites over the Sunnis.

To avoid this, the United States will have to communicate clearly with the Saudis, the Egyptians, and others. It will even have to consult with them. And its actions inside Iraq, Baghdad in particular, will have to be perceived as even-handed. Achieving that perception is no easy task; efforts to achieve it may be perceived as favoring the Sunnis over the Shiites. That in itself could jeopardize the talks.

So, we have a welcome beginning, but the ending is not yet in the script.