At this writing, the day after Saddam Hussein was hanged, the irrelevance of his person to the current situation in Iraq remains clear. As a symbol, however, he is likely to live on, a hero to many Sunnis, a devil to the Kurds and Shiites, a sign of the divisions among them all. Indeed, the timing of his death shows these divisions: Sunnis wanted him to live; Shiites wanted him dead as soon as the noose could be tied; Kurds wanted him killed later, for his massacres of the Kurds.
Saddam dead becomes a more important symbol than was Saddam alive. His execution leaves the problems of Iraq intact. The Bush administration has promised us that it will outline a new approach in the next week or two. It is becoming clearer that our presence in Iraq will shrink. The Bush administration is likely to do it. If it doesn't, the next one will.
There will be no military victory. Nor is there likely to be country-wide peace anytime soon. The execution of Saddam--the timing of the death and the reported cries of "Moqtada! Moqtada!" in the minute before he died--seemed to be one more indication that the government is run largely by Shiites for Shiite interests. How can the government gain the confidence and the resignation of the Sunni minority? From this distance, it seems not to try.
Indeed, the internal struggle may be insoluble no matter what influence outside powers seem to have. But outside powers--the regional powers above all--have it in their interest to foster a quiet, stable Iraq. Yet the United States seems determined to continue to go it alone. As for so long, we will talk to our friends, but not to Syria and Iran, who are not enemies, but clearly not inclined to amicability.
The Baker-Hamilton Commission, of course, put a New Diplomatic Offensive at the top of its list of recommendations. It has not been rejected, but it was not warmly received. Moreover, Secretary Rice has argued against a new, direct approach to Syria and Iran (See her comments to Jim Lehrer and Reuters ). In essence they seem to boil down to two. First, our positions have been made clear to both countries; if they want a stable Iraq, they can act to get it. Second, in the case of Iran, we would risk having to negotiate over their nuclear program, the continuation of which is non-negotiable.
As I have written before, talks are risky and their success is not guaranteed. Nor do either Syria or Iran have clean hands in Iraq. But talks and their close partner, negotiations, can at the very least put new arguments on the table, ready to be examined by the other side. They can clarify positions that seem ambiguous; they can correct misperceptions. And they can suggest a flexibility, a reasonableness, that unfortunately seems foreign to administration policy in the Middle East.
Whatever choice is made at the beginning of 2007, the American position in Iraq will be vastly different by its end. The prospects give us little to celebrate at this New Year; let us hope that their fulfillment gives us much at the next.
31 December 2006
20 November 2006
An Initiative from the Umma?
The news that the president of Indonesia called for other countries to become involved in creating a peace settlement in Iraq should be welcome. This is the first time that a Muslim country has made such a suggestion publicly. Would that Indonesia were in the Middle East, but a successful initiative that included much of the umma--the Muslim Community--could have several benefits that would help make the region more stable. The umma has been unable to act effectively together, even against Israel, which has contributed to the growth of extremism, of Al Qaeda and its allies. And the umma, if it could speak with one voice, would be more likely to be heard by the factions killing each other than any Western voice.
A Muslim initiative would be unlikely to make Iraq more democratic, however. Democracy, after all, is not valued as highly by Saudi Arabia, Syria, or other Muslim countries as it is by the United States, the Bush administration in particular.
Because a Muslim initiative would probably not be designed to foster democracy, the Bush administration may be reluctant to encourage such an initiative or to reject it if it were made. In addition, the administration was reluctant to give up control in Iraq to the United Nations or anyone else after we broke (and owned) Iraq and has been equally reluctant to rely on diplomacy, with the compromises its requires, to achieve its goals. Unless it is prepared to lose everything in Iraq, both diplomacy and the cession of control will be required, sooner or later.
The Baker commission is likely to recommend diplomacy, which may be the push the administration needs.
A Muslim initiative would be unlikely to make Iraq more democratic, however. Democracy, after all, is not valued as highly by Saudi Arabia, Syria, or other Muslim countries as it is by the United States, the Bush administration in particular.
Because a Muslim initiative would probably not be designed to foster democracy, the Bush administration may be reluctant to encourage such an initiative or to reject it if it were made. In addition, the administration was reluctant to give up control in Iraq to the United Nations or anyone else after we broke (and owned) Iraq and has been equally reluctant to rely on diplomacy, with the compromises its requires, to achieve its goals. Unless it is prepared to lose everything in Iraq, both diplomacy and the cession of control will be required, sooner or later.
The Baker commission is likely to recommend diplomacy, which may be the push the administration needs.
08 November 2006
Revenge or the Other Cheek?
When the Republicans took over the House of Representatives 12 years ago, they unseated a Democratic leadership that had been in power for 40 years. Resentment among those who now found themselves in charge was rife. The Democrats had indeed been arrogant and self-satisfied in the way they ran the House. Cooperation with the minority party was better than it is now, but the distribution of the resources available and the procedures adopted because the majority could left the Republicans severely disadvantaged.
The Republicans of Gingrich's new 104th Congress promised not to do to the Democrats what had been done to them. In recent years, however, the House of Hastert has done everything it could to make the minority party powerless, even to the point of not including Democrats in Conference committees to negotiate differences in legislation with the Senate.
The House of Nancy Pelosi has an opportunity to foster cooperation between Democrats and Republicans that their Republican predecessors abandoned. With growing opposition among Republicans to the policies favored by the President and what appears to a growing group of conservative and moderate Democrats, it would seem to be to everyone's advantage to blur the ideological divisions that have poisoned the atmosphere in Congress and made it markedly less effective than it might have been.
The problems this country are severe enough, the choices we need to make unpleasant enough, that cooperation across party lines will be essential if we are to resolve them without forcing or facing crises. Watch, then, how the Pelosi House deals with the people on the other side of the aisle. Revenge would be bitter; better would it be to turn the other cheek.
The Republicans of Gingrich's new 104th Congress promised not to do to the Democrats what had been done to them. In recent years, however, the House of Hastert has done everything it could to make the minority party powerless, even to the point of not including Democrats in Conference committees to negotiate differences in legislation with the Senate.
The House of Nancy Pelosi has an opportunity to foster cooperation between Democrats and Republicans that their Republican predecessors abandoned. With growing opposition among Republicans to the policies favored by the President and what appears to a growing group of conservative and moderate Democrats, it would seem to be to everyone's advantage to blur the ideological divisions that have poisoned the atmosphere in Congress and made it markedly less effective than it might have been.
The problems this country are severe enough, the choices we need to make unpleasant enough, that cooperation across party lines will be essential if we are to resolve them without forcing or facing crises. Watch, then, how the Pelosi House deals with the people on the other side of the aisle. Revenge would be bitter; better would it be to turn the other cheek.
04 November 2006
Rule by the Insincere
Michael Kinsley wrote a marvelous essay for the Book Review section of Sunday's New York Times (registration required). Two paragraphs, somewhat repetitive, captured my own view of the problems of political dialogue today:
It would be naive to the extreme to expect reasoned statements from all politicians all the time when they are on the campaign trail. But surely we can do bettter than we do. One of the most frequent comments about the Bush administration's attack on John Kerry after his botched joke about serving in Iraq was that no one believed that Kerry really believed that those fighting the war were stupid. (By the way, who will remember what he said six months from now?)
You can applaud the Bush attack as brilliant politics. Perhaps it was. But the disingenuousness of the charges was, to my mind, disgusting. That word is strong and used too often, but it describes accurately my visceral, perhaps overblown, reaction to the episode.
Not that the Democrats are better. Every announcement by the Bush adminstration, every story about a Republican is followed by Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, and a score of other senior Democrats parading to the microphones to relay some predictably contrary message. Some Republican is corrupt in some way. Some interest of the American people is being harmed somehow. Someone should resign, and now. How much of this do they believe; how much of the angst and anger they show is merely tactical, stemming from the desire to have their side win? From all indications, most of it.
It may be that in this day of ubiquitous news coverage and sound bytes little else is possible. Putting on a good show for the cameras is indeed necessary for political success. But there is little sign that the real work necessary for governing is being done. With too few exceptions, policies that might solve the severe problems that we will soon face are neither being formulated nor advanced by those we have elected. The disingenuous rule.
In my view, the worst form of cheating in American democracy today is intellectual dishonesty. The conversation in our democracy is dominated by disingenuousness. Candidates and partisan commentators strike poses of outrage that they don’t really feel, take positions that they would not take if the shoe was on the other foot (e.g., criticizing Bush when you gave Clinton a pass, or vice versa), feel no obligation toward logical consistency. Our democracy occasionally punishes outright lies but not brazen insincerity. When we vote after a modern political campaign run by expensive professionals, we have almost no idea what the victor really believes or what he or she might do in office.
The biggest flaw in our democracy is, as I say, the enormous tolerance for intellectual dishonesty. Politicians are held to account for outright lies, but there seems to be no sanction against saying things you obviously don’t believe. There is no reward for logical consistency, and no punishment for changing your story depending on the circumstances. Yet one minor exercise in disingenuousness can easily have a greater impact on an election than any number of crooked voting machines. And it seems to me, though I can’t prove it, that this problem is getting worse and worse.
It would be naive to the extreme to expect reasoned statements from all politicians all the time when they are on the campaign trail. But surely we can do bettter than we do. One of the most frequent comments about the Bush administration's attack on John Kerry after his botched joke about serving in Iraq was that no one believed that Kerry really believed that those fighting the war were stupid. (By the way, who will remember what he said six months from now?)
You can applaud the Bush attack as brilliant politics. Perhaps it was. But the disingenuousness of the charges was, to my mind, disgusting. That word is strong and used too often, but it describes accurately my visceral, perhaps overblown, reaction to the episode.
Not that the Democrats are better. Every announcement by the Bush adminstration, every story about a Republican is followed by Harry Reid, Nancy Pelosi, and a score of other senior Democrats parading to the microphones to relay some predictably contrary message. Some Republican is corrupt in some way. Some interest of the American people is being harmed somehow. Someone should resign, and now. How much of this do they believe; how much of the angst and anger they show is merely tactical, stemming from the desire to have their side win? From all indications, most of it.
It may be that in this day of ubiquitous news coverage and sound bytes little else is possible. Putting on a good show for the cameras is indeed necessary for political success. But there is little sign that the real work necessary for governing is being done. With too few exceptions, policies that might solve the severe problems that we will soon face are neither being formulated nor advanced by those we have elected. The disingenuous rule.
15 October 2006
A New Course for Iraq: It's Time
It is time to chart a new course in Iraq. The violence is increasing. It may be outside anyone's control. Indeed, according to an American source cited by The Washington Post's David Ignatius, Moqtada Al-Sadr, leader of the Mahdi Army, a prime source of the death squads terrorizing Sunnis in Baghdad and elsewhere, recently told Iraqi intelligence that "an increasing number of Shiite death squads, operating under the name of his Mahdi Army, are Iranian pasdaran staff officers and Hezbollah fighters, who are executing operational activities that he is not aware of, nor can he control." The support for the war in the United States continues to fall; cries for withdrawal continue to increase.
In brief, the administration needs to adopt a different course. The current one is unsustainable. Dennis Ross outlined an alternative in this morning's Washington Post that may offer the best hope for a reasonable outcome.
An important first step is to recognize that our ultimate aim--a stable, prosperous, democratic Iraq that can serve as an example for the rest of the region--cannot be reached in the short run or while we are are enmeshed in the conflicts in Iraq. The goals that Ross believes can be reached are much more limited:
To achieve them, Ross proposes three sets of negotiations. The results of all are interwoven: one will affect the others. Success in any of them is far from assured.
One is between the United States and the Maliki government over a timetable for withdrawal. The alternative here is simply the unilateral declaration of a deadline for getting our troops out. Given that Iraqi's want us out in any case, this is a way to let them take responsibility for their country. All parties in the government can help shape the conditions under which our troops leave. As the Unite States has never intended to stay in Iraq in force in perpetuity, such negotiations can also reaffirm our intention to leave Iraq to the Iraqis.
Another is a national reconciliation conference among the parties in Iraq. The adoption of the constitution left several issues unresolved--notably the right of secession and whether and how to share oil revenue. These and other issues dividing Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites need to be discussed and resolved in negotiations that, unlike to talks over the constitution, have no firm deadline.
These negotiations may be the most difficult of the three. Are there spokesmen for all three groups with enough authority to ensure that the results they approve win enough acceptance to stop the violence? At this distance, we cannot say.
The third set of negotiations is a regional conference of the countries that are most affected by the violence in Iraq and that will bear the brunt of the consequences of American withdrawal: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Perhaps Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates should be included as well.
An effort like this should have been made some time ago. The American intervention in Iraq cannot succeed with the opposition of these countries; the chances of its success increase exponentially if they help.
A major stumbling block to this conference is the reluctance of the Bush administration to talk to Syria and Iran. That must be overcome. And for the conference to succeed in getting these countries to participate in efforts that can make Iraq stable, the administration must show understanding, flexibility, patience, and imagination that are always in short supply.
As that suggests, this conference, like the other two sets of negotiations, is a long shot. But failure is not preordained. As of now, no alternative seems better. Particularly "Stay the Course."
In brief, the administration needs to adopt a different course. The current one is unsustainable. Dennis Ross outlined an alternative in this morning's Washington Post that may offer the best hope for a reasonable outcome.
An important first step is to recognize that our ultimate aim--a stable, prosperous, democratic Iraq that can serve as an example for the rest of the region--cannot be reached in the short run or while we are are enmeshed in the conflicts in Iraq. The goals that Ross believes can be reached are much more limited:
Iraq could, in the best case, evolve into a country that has the following: a central government with limited powers; provincial governments with extensive autonomy; sharing of oil revenue; and, at the local level, some rough form of representation and tolerance for minorities. In those circumstances Iraq might eventually achieve stability.
To achieve them, Ross proposes three sets of negotiations. The results of all are interwoven: one will affect the others. Success in any of them is far from assured.
One is between the United States and the Maliki government over a timetable for withdrawal. The alternative here is simply the unilateral declaration of a deadline for getting our troops out. Given that Iraqi's want us out in any case, this is a way to let them take responsibility for their country. All parties in the government can help shape the conditions under which our troops leave. As the Unite States has never intended to stay in Iraq in force in perpetuity, such negotiations can also reaffirm our intention to leave Iraq to the Iraqis.
Another is a national reconciliation conference among the parties in Iraq. The adoption of the constitution left several issues unresolved--notably the right of secession and whether and how to share oil revenue. These and other issues dividing Kurds, Sunnis, and Shiites need to be discussed and resolved in negotiations that, unlike to talks over the constitution, have no firm deadline.
These negotiations may be the most difficult of the three. Are there spokesmen for all three groups with enough authority to ensure that the results they approve win enough acceptance to stop the violence? At this distance, we cannot say.
The third set of negotiations is a regional conference of the countries that are most affected by the violence in Iraq and that will bear the brunt of the consequences of American withdrawal: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. Perhaps Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates should be included as well.
An effort like this should have been made some time ago. The American intervention in Iraq cannot succeed with the opposition of these countries; the chances of its success increase exponentially if they help.
A major stumbling block to this conference is the reluctance of the Bush administration to talk to Syria and Iran. That must be overcome. And for the conference to succeed in getting these countries to participate in efforts that can make Iraq stable, the administration must show understanding, flexibility, patience, and imagination that are always in short supply.
As that suggests, this conference, like the other two sets of negotiations, is a long shot. But failure is not preordained. As of now, no alternative seems better. Particularly "Stay the Course."
06 September 2006
Our Absolute Enemy: Iran
In his speech about terrorism to the Military Officers Association of America, President Bush equated Iran with Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. That is a futile and dangerous equation.
He quotes Iranian President Ahmadinejad several times. The rhetoric is, indeed, chilling. Ahmadinejad wishes us the worst. And the evidence that Iran has supported Hezbollah and other terrorists is, from all indications, overwhelming. Do not doubt it.
But the problem is, what can we do? We already have sanctions against Iran. We never reestablished diplomatic relations after the hostages were seized in 1979. We are moving to get a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have other countries join us in imposing sanctions. Yet that seems destined to fail because of objections to it by the Russians and Chinese. In short, we have little leverage. There is almost nothing we can do, short of applying military force, that can impel the Iranian government to change its course.
And let’s not get into the use of military force. The chances of its being effective are low; the odds that it will be counterproductive are high.
So what can we do? There is not much that we can do that will be effective in the short run. In the longer run, however, Iran will change. We must begin to establish a framework for relations that a more moderate, less antagonistic Iran can grow into. That means finding ways to open a dialogue, so that when Iran is ready to talk seriously about having good relations with us, it will be easy to reply.
These new channels of communication can be formal or informal, public or private. A key element is that it understood by the Iranians that their messages will be heard by the U.S. government.
A benefit of opening such channels is that they can make it easier for Iran to step back from confrontation with us, if they are so inclined. They can be a small carrot to go along with the wet noodle we are calling a stick.
He quotes Iranian President Ahmadinejad several times. The rhetoric is, indeed, chilling. Ahmadinejad wishes us the worst. And the evidence that Iran has supported Hezbollah and other terrorists is, from all indications, overwhelming. Do not doubt it.
But the problem is, what can we do? We already have sanctions against Iran. We never reestablished diplomatic relations after the hostages were seized in 1979. We are moving to get a United Nations Security Council resolution that would have other countries join us in imposing sanctions. Yet that seems destined to fail because of objections to it by the Russians and Chinese. In short, we have little leverage. There is almost nothing we can do, short of applying military force, that can impel the Iranian government to change its course.
And let’s not get into the use of military force. The chances of its being effective are low; the odds that it will be counterproductive are high.
So what can we do? There is not much that we can do that will be effective in the short run. In the longer run, however, Iran will change. We must begin to establish a framework for relations that a more moderate, less antagonistic Iran can grow into. That means finding ways to open a dialogue, so that when Iran is ready to talk seriously about having good relations with us, it will be easy to reply.
These new channels of communication can be formal or informal, public or private. A key element is that it understood by the Iranians that their messages will be heard by the U.S. government.
A benefit of opening such channels is that they can make it easier for Iran to step back from confrontation with us, if they are so inclined. They can be a small carrot to go along with the wet noodle we are calling a stick.
21 August 2006
Islamic Democracy? We Hope?
An article in the New York Times this morning about Islam points out how careful we should be about how we approach the region. The article argues that Egyptians are coming to identify themselves more than as Egyptians or as Arabs. The key points are:
Of course, these three elements of identity are intertwined, but it matters which one is prominent. Until 1967, Nasser’s successes made Arabism seem to be the wave of the future. After the perceived success of the October War, Sadat made an Egypt-centered identity respectable. Now, with the success of Hezbollah in tweaking Israel's nose in Lebanon and the success of Al-Qaeda and the other Islamic fundamentalist groups elsewhere, a devotion to Islam seems to promise a way to gain self-respect and the world's respect.
Behind the growth of Islam lie myriad failures. In some ways the defeat in the Six-Day War at the hands of Israel is still felt. Arab failures in science, in economics, and in politics when compared to the world-changing success of the West, has left the Arab world hungry for the kind of achievements that once had Baghdad the capitol of a legendary, thriving empire.
Egyptians and Arabs more generally see nothing like that. They see regimes that are corrupt, intellectually bankrupt, and either weak or tyrannous.
We hope to make these regimes democratic. We assume that if they become democratic, beholden to the people, they will become a source of pride and lead to achievements that will make the Arab world thrive. That assumption is partly true: pride and achievement are not the necessary result of democracy, but in the modern world it is hard to sustain either without it.
A danger is that the democracy we promote will be seen as antithetical to Islam. Certainly Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenants think it is. Many in the West have questioned whether democracy and Islam are compatible. And, in truth we will find little comfort in the pronouncements of religious parties.
Yet we must be willing to tolerate parties that are willing to compete in democratic elections, promise to retain the political structures essential to a democracy, and declare themselves bound by the expressed will of the electorate. Are there such parties? I don't yet know. Perhaps.
The essential thing is that we cannot allow democracy and America to become so intertwined in the minds of the Arab world that they will abandon the promise of the former out of distaste for the latter. In the long run, the establishment of democratic regimes will benefit us. In the short run, however, we find them hard to like and to comprehend.
Hezbollah’s perceived triumph has propelled, and been propelled by, a wave already washing over the region. Political Islam was widely seen as the antidote to the failures of Arab nationalism, Communism, socialism and, most recently, what is seen as the false promise of American-style democracy....The lesson learned by many Arabs from the war in Lebanon is that an Islamic movement, in this case Hezbollah, restored dignity and honor to a bruised and battered identity....Hezbollah’s perceived victory has highlighted, and to many people here validated, the rise of another unifying ideology, a kind of Arab-Islamic nationalism.
Of course, these three elements of identity are intertwined, but it matters which one is prominent. Until 1967, Nasser’s successes made Arabism seem to be the wave of the future. After the perceived success of the October War, Sadat made an Egypt-centered identity respectable. Now, with the success of Hezbollah in tweaking Israel's nose in Lebanon and the success of Al-Qaeda and the other Islamic fundamentalist groups elsewhere, a devotion to Islam seems to promise a way to gain self-respect and the world's respect.
Behind the growth of Islam lie myriad failures. In some ways the defeat in the Six-Day War at the hands of Israel is still felt. Arab failures in science, in economics, and in politics when compared to the world-changing success of the West, has left the Arab world hungry for the kind of achievements that once had Baghdad the capitol of a legendary, thriving empire.
Egyptians and Arabs more generally see nothing like that. They see regimes that are corrupt, intellectually bankrupt, and either weak or tyrannous.
We hope to make these regimes democratic. We assume that if they become democratic, beholden to the people, they will become a source of pride and lead to achievements that will make the Arab world thrive. That assumption is partly true: pride and achievement are not the necessary result of democracy, but in the modern world it is hard to sustain either without it.
A danger is that the democracy we promote will be seen as antithetical to Islam. Certainly Osama Bin Laden and his lieutenants think it is. Many in the West have questioned whether democracy and Islam are compatible. And, in truth we will find little comfort in the pronouncements of religious parties.
Yet we must be willing to tolerate parties that are willing to compete in democratic elections, promise to retain the political structures essential to a democracy, and declare themselves bound by the expressed will of the electorate. Are there such parties? I don't yet know. Perhaps.
The essential thing is that we cannot allow democracy and America to become so intertwined in the minds of the Arab world that they will abandon the promise of the former out of distaste for the latter. In the long run, the establishment of democratic regimes will benefit us. In the short run, however, we find them hard to like and to comprehend.
02 August 2006
Lebanon's Cost in Iraq
The United States has shown unequivocal support for Israel in the current conflict in Lebanon. This is not new for the Bush administration, which long ago abandoned anything resembling even-handedness in dealing with Israel and its enemies. Through much of the conflict we have been able to play the role of honest broker, making it possible for Henry Kissinger and Presidents Carter and Clinton to mediate between Israel and Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinians. Now we express "our strong concern about the impact of Israeli military operations on innocent civilians," but put no pressure on Israel to end those operations before it is ready. That statement is about the current crisis, but the approach is the same taken toward every Israeli attack since the Bush administration came into office.
Now, let me quickly say, that Israel has been reacting to strong provocation. Neither Hezbollah nor Hamas, nor Fatah before its electoral defeat behaved responsibly. All three fostered terrorism; all three deserve much of the punishment that Israel has dealt out. But it has not been in the longer-term interests of Israel to have the United States seen to be Israel's apologist. Instead, Israel needs to have a United States that can speak to and negotiate with all parties in these conflicts. Only with American mediation can Israel hope to get the peace that Israel, like everyone in the Middle East, needs.
The actions of the administration in the current crisis have added to the view, held by many in the Arab "street", that the United States is an enemy of the Arab world. Not only do we fully back Israeli actions, we also refuse to speak to Syria even as we make demands of it. Nor do we speak to Hezbollah, Hamas, or Iran. As I've written in other entries, this has had its costs.
One cost that has been mentioned rarely if at all, is that it becomes ever more difficult for people in Iraq to gravitate toward us. We play into the hands of those that hate and fight us in Iraq--including Al Qaeda and its allies--by siding completely with Israel.
This is not true only of the jihadists and those irreconcilably opposed to the United States. One of the characteristics of the Arab world and parts of the Moslem world more generally, including Iran, is that many take events in the Arab-Israeli conflict personally. This is similar to the way many Americans understand the September 11 attacks: Mohammed Atta and his team were attacking not just on strangers in distant cities but all of us. For Arabs, for Iraqis, Israel's attacks are similar; Israel's successes are the failures of all Arabs.
So when Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came to the United States, he condemned Israel's "hostile acts against Lebanon" and was under pressure from parties within Iraq's parliament to cancel the trip altogether. He remarks garnered criticism here, but they were the least he could do.
The criticism of Maliki was ill-considered. One hopes that the need for him to make it has entered the considerations of those developing our policy toward Israel and the conflict in Lebanon.
Now, let me quickly say, that Israel has been reacting to strong provocation. Neither Hezbollah nor Hamas, nor Fatah before its electoral defeat behaved responsibly. All three fostered terrorism; all three deserve much of the punishment that Israel has dealt out. But it has not been in the longer-term interests of Israel to have the United States seen to be Israel's apologist. Instead, Israel needs to have a United States that can speak to and negotiate with all parties in these conflicts. Only with American mediation can Israel hope to get the peace that Israel, like everyone in the Middle East, needs.
The actions of the administration in the current crisis have added to the view, held by many in the Arab "street", that the United States is an enemy of the Arab world. Not only do we fully back Israeli actions, we also refuse to speak to Syria even as we make demands of it. Nor do we speak to Hezbollah, Hamas, or Iran. As I've written in other entries, this has had its costs.
One cost that has been mentioned rarely if at all, is that it becomes ever more difficult for people in Iraq to gravitate toward us. We play into the hands of those that hate and fight us in Iraq--including Al Qaeda and its allies--by siding completely with Israel.
This is not true only of the jihadists and those irreconcilably opposed to the United States. One of the characteristics of the Arab world and parts of the Moslem world more generally, including Iran, is that many take events in the Arab-Israeli conflict personally. This is similar to the way many Americans understand the September 11 attacks: Mohammed Atta and his team were attacking not just on strangers in distant cities but all of us. For Arabs, for Iraqis, Israel's attacks are similar; Israel's successes are the failures of all Arabs.
So when Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came to the United States, he condemned Israel's "hostile acts against Lebanon" and was under pressure from parties within Iraq's parliament to cancel the trip altogether. He remarks garnered criticism here, but they were the least he could do.
The criticism of Maliki was ill-considered. One hopes that the need for him to make it has entered the considerations of those developing our policy toward Israel and the conflict in Lebanon.
31 July 2006
Lasting Settlement in Lebanon?
Secretary Rice is trying to get what she calls a lasting settlement in Lebanon. Let us hope she succeeds. But the settlement she describes is too narrow to be lasting.
The settlement she is aiming for would place an "international Stabilization Force" on the border between Lebanon and Israel. It would allow the Lebanese government to extend its authority to that border, prohibit "armed groups," i.e., Hezbollah, and foreign forces, i.e., Syrian troops, where the Stabilization Force is deployed, and enforce an embargo against weapons delivered anyone other than the Lebanese government or the international force. The international force would also help the Lebanese patrol the border with Syria.
This reflects the decision not to talk to those we oppose. In her statement Rice repeatedly says that the "Lebanon, Israel, and the international community agree..." on the points she makes. The entire statement is clearly aimed at Hezbollah and Syria. There are no carrots that might induce them to abide by it; the expectation seems to be that the international force would be a deterrent strong enough to prevent any challenge.
But it cannot be. Hezbollah is proving itself strong as an armed force; it is gaining political strength as the only Arab force that has been effective against Israel. Should Israel succeed in diminishing Hezbollah's military force, Hezbollah will strive to reconstitute it. Syria and Iran will help with the blessing, open or covert, of mush of the rest of the Arab world. The war will continue at some later time.
Moreover, there is little in the proposed settlement to help the Lebanese government. Support is declared for it; vague promises of help from the international force are given. But nowhere is there an assurance of concrete support that will help this weak state become strong. Indeed, the actions of both Israel and Hezbollah have weakened it, and it is quite possible that the presence of an international force will merely underline how weak the government is.
Let us hope that this minimal settlement can be reached. Do not attach high hopes to it. A lasting settlement will require harder work than the United States is currently prepared to do. It will require that all the actors be engaged, including those we would like to simply disappear.
The settlement she is aiming for would place an "international Stabilization Force" on the border between Lebanon and Israel. It would allow the Lebanese government to extend its authority to that border, prohibit "armed groups," i.e., Hezbollah, and foreign forces, i.e., Syrian troops, where the Stabilization Force is deployed, and enforce an embargo against weapons delivered anyone other than the Lebanese government or the international force. The international force would also help the Lebanese patrol the border with Syria.
This reflects the decision not to talk to those we oppose. In her statement Rice repeatedly says that the "Lebanon, Israel, and the international community agree..." on the points she makes. The entire statement is clearly aimed at Hezbollah and Syria. There are no carrots that might induce them to abide by it; the expectation seems to be that the international force would be a deterrent strong enough to prevent any challenge.
But it cannot be. Hezbollah is proving itself strong as an armed force; it is gaining political strength as the only Arab force that has been effective against Israel. Should Israel succeed in diminishing Hezbollah's military force, Hezbollah will strive to reconstitute it. Syria and Iran will help with the blessing, open or covert, of mush of the rest of the Arab world. The war will continue at some later time.
Moreover, there is little in the proposed settlement to help the Lebanese government. Support is declared for it; vague promises of help from the international force are given. But nowhere is there an assurance of concrete support that will help this weak state become strong. Indeed, the actions of both Israel and Hezbollah have weakened it, and it is quite possible that the presence of an international force will merely underline how weak the government is.
Let us hope that this minimal settlement can be reached. Do not attach high hopes to it. A lasting settlement will require harder work than the United States is currently prepared to do. It will require that all the actors be engaged, including those we would like to simply disappear.
24 July 2006
Talk to the Bad Guys
After writing the previous entry ("America, Deaf and Dumb," 23 July 2006), I saw the following paragraph in an op-ed piece by John McLaughlin in The Washington Post. McLaughlin was deputy director of the CIA during the first Bush administration:
I would go a step further than McLaughlin: Not talking to bad guys weakens us. It reduces the number of options we have available because of the difficulties of communicating anything. Options are increased when you and your interlocuteur know what you both think is important. When your options are reduced, the chances that you will find a satisfactory resolution to a problem are reduced as well.
"...even superpowers have to talk to bad guys. The absence of a diplomatic relationship with Iran and the deterioration of the one with Syria -- two countries that bear enormous responsibility for the current crisis -- leave the United States with fewer options and levers than might otherwise have been the case. Distasteful as it might have been to have or to maintain open and normal relations with such states, the absence of such relations ensures that we will have more blind spots than we can afford and that we will have to deal through surrogates on issues of vital importance to the United States. We will have to get over the notion that talking to bad guys somehow rewards them or is a sign of weakness. As a superpower, we ought to be able to communicate in a way that signals our strength and self-confidence."
I would go a step further than McLaughlin: Not talking to bad guys weakens us. It reduces the number of options we have available because of the difficulties of communicating anything. Options are increased when you and your interlocuteur know what you both think is important. When your options are reduced, the chances that you will find a satisfactory resolution to a problem are reduced as well.
23 July 2006
America, Deaf and Dumb
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, at this writing, is on her way to the Middle East to try to deal with the situation in Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah are fighting. Foreigners are evacuating the country. Almost 400 civilians have been killed. Israel is threatening to invade.
Secretary Rice will talk to the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Saudis. But she will not talk to the Syrians or the Iranians. We have diplomatic relations with neither country. We have forfeited our direct influence on both sides of the conflict. In so doing, we have, by choice, diminished our power.
It was not always thus. We have always been wary of Syria and aware of the nature of the regime. Yet Kissinger went to Damascus and to reach an agreement that helped Israel. In contrast, now, we rely on others. This is weakness, shown by shown by Bush's comment in St. Petersburg, caught when he thought the mike was turned off: “I felt like telling Kofi to get on the phone with Assad and make something happen." He cannot call Assad himself--by choice, neither nor any other senior administration official has a relationship with the Syrian leader. Indeed, as far as is known, we must rely on other countries or the media to relay the simplest message to either Syria or Iran. We cannot negotiate, we cannot warn, except through others.
This unwillingness to talk has been characteristic of the Bush administration. When the question of direct talks with Korea or Iran has come up, we have curtly refused, time and again. An administration that insists on its duty to take unilateral action insists on the need to hold only multilateral talks.
There seem to be two reasons for this. First, the administration believes that direct talks give legitimacy to its enemies. The President seems to equate talking to a foreign regime with supporting it, as if American relations with Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, and Hitler's Germany meant that we somehow approved of those regimes. The administrations' characterization of these two countries as irresponsible supporters of extremists, of terrorists, is close to the mark, but surely we would gain, in our knowledge of these countries, if nothing else, by having channels of communication readily available.
Second, the administration doesn't want to engage in mere talk. This is akin to a long-standing distrust of diplomats and their role held by many. It is true that talk can be cheap. But is also a way of opening or keeping open a communications channel that can at the least prevent misunderstanding. It can also lead to the satisfaction of mutual interests, which even countries that regard each other as enemies can have.
A result of this is that in the conflicts in Lebanon and with Iran and Korea, we have been curiously passive. We look for others to make the phone calls, to carry our water. We seem to pray for a miracle of regime change so that we can avoid the hard choices that dealing with these problems will entail.
Secretary Rice will talk to the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Saudis. But she will not talk to the Syrians or the Iranians. We have diplomatic relations with neither country. We have forfeited our direct influence on both sides of the conflict. In so doing, we have, by choice, diminished our power.
It was not always thus. We have always been wary of Syria and aware of the nature of the regime. Yet Kissinger went to Damascus and to reach an agreement that helped Israel. In contrast, now, we rely on others. This is weakness, shown by shown by Bush's comment in St. Petersburg, caught when he thought the mike was turned off: “I felt like telling Kofi to get on the phone with Assad and make something happen." He cannot call Assad himself--by choice, neither nor any other senior administration official has a relationship with the Syrian leader. Indeed, as far as is known, we must rely on other countries or the media to relay the simplest message to either Syria or Iran. We cannot negotiate, we cannot warn, except through others.
This unwillingness to talk has been characteristic of the Bush administration. When the question of direct talks with Korea or Iran has come up, we have curtly refused, time and again. An administration that insists on its duty to take unilateral action insists on the need to hold only multilateral talks.
There seem to be two reasons for this. First, the administration believes that direct talks give legitimacy to its enemies. The President seems to equate talking to a foreign regime with supporting it, as if American relations with Stalin's Russia, Mao's China, and Hitler's Germany meant that we somehow approved of those regimes. The administrations' characterization of these two countries as irresponsible supporters of extremists, of terrorists, is close to the mark, but surely we would gain, in our knowledge of these countries, if nothing else, by having channels of communication readily available.
Second, the administration doesn't want to engage in mere talk. This is akin to a long-standing distrust of diplomats and their role held by many. It is true that talk can be cheap. But is also a way of opening or keeping open a communications channel that can at the least prevent misunderstanding. It can also lead to the satisfaction of mutual interests, which even countries that regard each other as enemies can have.
A result of this is that in the conflicts in Lebanon and with Iran and Korea, we have been curiously passive. We look for others to make the phone calls, to carry our water. We seem to pray for a miracle of regime change so that we can avoid the hard choices that dealing with these problems will entail.
01 May 2006
The Anxiety-Detector Test
According to this morning's Washington Post, "The CIA, the FBI and other federal agencies are using polygraph machines more than ever to screen applicants and hunt for lawbreakers, even as scientists have become more certain that the equipment is ineffective in accurately detecting when people are lying."
The intelligence community has long depended on the polygraph as a part of its process for vetting potential employees. The CIA is now using it to find out who leaks information to the press. Yet as Larry C. Johnson writes, quoting friends in the intelligence community, "it only works against folks who have a conscience and a strongly developed sense of right and wrong." In truth, it measures anxiety, not lies.
The Post article cites a study made in 2002: "...if polygraphs were administered to a group of 10,000 people that included 10 spies, nearly 1,600 innocent people would fail the test -- and two of the spies would pass." And there's the rub.
The polygraph can provide an agency with information--valuable information--that it might not get otherwise. People fear the polygraph and will come clean about things that they would hide otherwise. That is the rationale for using it. Another rationale, not mentioned by the Post is that an agency appears to increase security when it uses it; an agency that abandoned it would be perceived as becoming less concerned with security.
But the flip side of this test is the large number of false positives that it gives. Is it better to catch 2 out of 10 spies or to implicate 1600 people? According to the article, the FBI fails a quarter of the people it tests. The CIA fails 30-40 percent of the entry-level applicants it tests. That last number is worse than it seems: these applicants have already gone through most of the pre-employment processing; the agency has determined that it wants them.
The costs of using the polygraph are high, in morale, talented people lost because they failed, and the effort to conduct them. These costs have not been measured against the benefits. Let us hope that the current brouhaha leads agencies to rethink how they use this tool.
The intelligence community has long depended on the polygraph as a part of its process for vetting potential employees. The CIA is now using it to find out who leaks information to the press. Yet as Larry C. Johnson writes, quoting friends in the intelligence community, "it only works against folks who have a conscience and a strongly developed sense of right and wrong." In truth, it measures anxiety, not lies.
The Post article cites a study made in 2002: "...if polygraphs were administered to a group of 10,000 people that included 10 spies, nearly 1,600 innocent people would fail the test -- and two of the spies would pass." And there's the rub.
The polygraph can provide an agency with information--valuable information--that it might not get otherwise. People fear the polygraph and will come clean about things that they would hide otherwise. That is the rationale for using it. Another rationale, not mentioned by the Post is that an agency appears to increase security when it uses it; an agency that abandoned it would be perceived as becoming less concerned with security.
But the flip side of this test is the large number of false positives that it gives. Is it better to catch 2 out of 10 spies or to implicate 1600 people? According to the article, the FBI fails a quarter of the people it tests. The CIA fails 30-40 percent of the entry-level applicants it tests. That last number is worse than it seems: these applicants have already gone through most of the pre-employment processing; the agency has determined that it wants them.
The costs of using the polygraph are high, in morale, talented people lost because they failed, and the effort to conduct them. These costs have not been measured against the benefits. Let us hope that the current brouhaha leads agencies to rethink how they use this tool.
28 April 2006
What is an American: The National Anthem in Spanish?
A story from the AP says that Adam Kidron, a British music producer, has created a Spanish version of the Star-Spangled Banner. President Bush responded as, I suspect, many Americans will:
He was also quoted as saying that "One of the important things here is that we not lose our national soul."
This gets to the heart of an issue that has come up a number of times in the past year: what makes a citizen? Last fall, the British instituted a test for British citizenship. It clearly focused on cultural issues. The French are still struggling with "Frenchness" in the wake of the riots that rocked Paris and other cities. For them, too, citizenship is rooted in cultural issues. If one walks like a Frenchman and, most importantly, talks like a Frenchman, then one must be a Frenchman. The Dutch, too, have addressed the issue, requiring prospective citizens from non-Western countries to view a video that features bare-breasted women, kissing gays, and other things typical in Holland that the unenlightened might find hard to tolerate. The Dutch want then to be sure they know what they are getting into.
The test of American citizenship, however, has not been cultural, but political. The prospective citizen is tested on his or her knowledge of the American political system. Do they know how many branches of government there are? How are treaties approved? And so forth.
The test, however, is only administered in English, which points to a tension that has been inherent in our view of ourselves since the United States came to be. We view ourselves as melting pot, encompassing people of all cultures, yet we have a culture distinctly our own, easily recognizable around the world.
This is the tension that "Nuestro Himno" addresses. Must Americans sing it in English? Mark Krikorian, head of the Washington-based Center for Immigration Studies, asked, rhetorically: "Would the French accept people singing the La Marseillaise in English as a sign of French patriotism? Of course not." President Bush, of course, echoed that sentiment.
Yet we are not French, and the essence of Americanness includes tolerance, at a minimum, of other cultures. Americans, true Americans, have spoken German, Italian, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and myriad other languages. This country is unique in its ability to accept people of other cultures as our own. A true American can sing the Star-Spangled Banner in any language.
"I think the national anthem ought to be sung in English, and I think people who want to be a citizen of this country ought to learn English and they ought to learn to sing the national anthem in English."
He was also quoted as saying that "One of the important things here is that we not lose our national soul."
This gets to the heart of an issue that has come up a number of times in the past year: what makes a citizen? Last fall, the British instituted a test for British citizenship. It clearly focused on cultural issues. The French are still struggling with "Frenchness" in the wake of the riots that rocked Paris and other cities. For them, too, citizenship is rooted in cultural issues. If one walks like a Frenchman and, most importantly, talks like a Frenchman, then one must be a Frenchman. The Dutch, too, have addressed the issue, requiring prospective citizens from non-Western countries to view a video that features bare-breasted women, kissing gays, and other things typical in Holland that the unenlightened might find hard to tolerate. The Dutch want then to be sure they know what they are getting into.
The test of American citizenship, however, has not been cultural, but political. The prospective citizen is tested on his or her knowledge of the American political system. Do they know how many branches of government there are? How are treaties approved? And so forth.
The test, however, is only administered in English, which points to a tension that has been inherent in our view of ourselves since the United States came to be. We view ourselves as melting pot, encompassing people of all cultures, yet we have a culture distinctly our own, easily recognizable around the world.
This is the tension that "Nuestro Himno" addresses. Must Americans sing it in English? Mark Krikorian, head of the Washington-based Center for Immigration Studies, asked, rhetorically: "Would the French accept people singing the La Marseillaise in English as a sign of French patriotism? Of course not." President Bush, of course, echoed that sentiment.
Yet we are not French, and the essence of Americanness includes tolerance, at a minimum, of other cultures. Americans, true Americans, have spoken German, Italian, Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and myriad other languages. This country is unique in its ability to accept people of other cultures as our own. A true American can sing the Star-Spangled Banner in any language.
12 March 2006
When Did They Know?
I have had numerous discussions with friends about the origins of the war in Iraq where they argued that the Bush administration knew, without doubt, that Saddam had no weapons of mass destruction. A loose reading of Paul Pillar's article in the current issue of Foreign Affairs can lend some credence to this, though he does say that "there was indeed a broad consensus [in the intelligence community] that such programs existed."
(Parenthetically, Pillar's article gives an instructive description of the subtle ways that the analysis of data by the CIA was skewed by predelictions for policy of those at the top of the U.S. Government.)
My answer to my friends has included reference to Hans Blix's memoir, Disarming Iraq. Blix indicates that as late as early February 2003 he believed that his inspectors would find Iraq's WMD, despite their failure to turn up anything after months of trying.
Now, it appears that even Saddam's generals believed that they had them. The New York Times citing a classified Pentagon report, writes that:
That was in December 2002.
In addition, an article in the May-June issue of Foreign Affairs, based on what appears to be the same report, includes this footnote:
If senior Iraqi officials believed these weapons existed, it cannot be surprising that American officials, and American intelligence, believed the same. Was this a casus belli? That is a different question. In my view it was not.
As often happens when policy goes wrong, critics can be divided into those who believe those responsible were knaves, who did wrong purposefully, and those who believe they were fools, who did wrong out of ignorance or stupidity. The last word may be too strong--President Bush and his advisors are not stupid. But they were fools, not knaves.
(Parenthetically, Pillar's article gives an instructive description of the subtle ways that the analysis of data by the CIA was skewed by predelictions for policy of those at the top of the U.S. Government.)
My answer to my friends has included reference to Hans Blix's memoir, Disarming Iraq. Blix indicates that as late as early February 2003 he believed that his inspectors would find Iraq's WMD, despite their failure to turn up anything after months of trying.
Now, it appears that even Saddam's generals believed that they had them. The New York Times citing a classified Pentagon report, writes that:
The Iraqi dictator was so secretive and kept information so compartmentalized that his top military leaders were stunned when he told them three months before the war that he had no weapons of mass destruction, and they were demoralized because they had counted on hidden stocks of poison gas or germ weapons for the nation's defense.
That was in December 2002.
In addition, an article in the May-June issue of Foreign Affairs, based on what appears to be the same report, includes this footnote:
For many months after the fall of Baghdad, a number of senior Iraqi officials in coalition custody continued to believe it possible that Iraq still possessed a WMD capability hidden away somewhere (although they adamantly insisted that they had no direct knowledge of WMD programs). Coalition interviewers discovered that this belief was based on the fact that Iraq had possessed and used WMD in the past and might need them again; on the plausibility of secret, compartmentalized WMD programs existing given how the Iraqi regime worked; and on the fact that so many Western governments believed such programs existed.
If senior Iraqi officials believed these weapons existed, it cannot be surprising that American officials, and American intelligence, believed the same. Was this a casus belli? That is a different question. In my view it was not.
As often happens when policy goes wrong, critics can be divided into those who believe those responsible were knaves, who did wrong purposefully, and those who believe they were fools, who did wrong out of ignorance or stupidity. The last word may be too strong--President Bush and his advisors are not stupid. But they were fools, not knaves.
07 March 2006
Freedom is Not Enough
President Bush has often said that that freedom is a universal value, desired by everyone, made possible by democracy. He reiterated this recently, in January, when speaking to students and others at Kansas State University:
This is a marvelous vision, one that many people share, and not just in the United States. Why, then, do people in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere reject democracy, or at least do not embrace it? The answer to this question is a key to understanding what is happening in Iraq. It seems that when we "broke" Iraq we believed in the universality of this vision, that no sane person could fight against it.
There have been many ideological and religious arguments against democracy. Lenin and Hitler made theirs, which amounted to the need for a small group or leader, armed with a true understanding of the world, to take charge and foster change in the polity. The masses could not be trusted to act unguided. Before these 20th Century monsters, royalists made their own form of the argument. Long before that, Plato did much the same thing. Bin Laden and the jihadis, calling on the true followers of Muhammed, are the most recent bears of this tradition.
But the essence of the weakness of democracy in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Weimer Germany stems from something more basic than the somewhat abstract and convoluted thinking of Bolsheviks, Nazis, and Jihadis. People crave security. They want to exile fear. Where democracy is weak, fear runs rampant.
Democracy requires trust. As a citizen, you have to trust that the people you live and work with will adhere to democratic processes, that they will accept the limitations that democracy imposes. These limits have to do with the power of the state, which, following Weber, holds a monopoly on the use of force--it controls the army, the police, and other institutions that are licensed to use force.
But in Iraq and Afghanistan, that trust is absent. So is the monopoly on the use of force. People must rely on the means available to them and their neighbors to defend themselves.
Before the destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the Sunni-dominated insurgency was the major apparent source of fear. The link between the insecurity the insurgency has fostered and the success of our democratic project in Iraq has been recognized by the United States. From all appearances, significant progress has been made in at least parts of Iraq in reducing the fear felt by the population. The rising totals of people goaing to the polls through 2005 is an indication of that. (Whether the progress has been sufficient is a different question.)
But the destruction of the mosque has clarifed the threats to democracy in Iraq. It is now clear that Iraqis have reason to fear each other. The insurgents, particularly Zarqawi's group, are bringing their murderous antipathy to the Shiites to the fore. Shiites have replied in kind. All are adding to memories from Iraqi history of brutality that have left suspicions, fears, that will not dissipate. Each group has given the others reasons to distrust it: Sunni massacres of Shiites in 1991 and throughout Saddam's regime; Sunni memories of Shiite insurgents under British rule; Kurdish experiences as targets of Arabs and Turks over a century and more. They all can declare a right to vengeance and exercise it.
What has become most clear is that each group is turning to its own to defend itself against the others. The Sunnis have insurgents. The Kurds have had their own militias for decades. Now the Shiites have the Mahdi Army and the like. In short, the Iraqi democracy has no monopoly of force, particularly as the army and police are formed of ethnic-based units, many of which seem to have more loyalty to their own kind than to the Iraqi state.
This is much like a communalist riff on Weimar Germany. In the 1920s, all large German political parties--nationalist, socialist, or communist--had its own group of thugs. The most renowned of these, of course, was the SA, the brownshirts. When economic security disappeared as the Depression deepened, the strength of these groups grew. Each group assaulted its enemies, with little interference from the republic. The Nazis, promising security, triumphed. Democracy, illegitimate, ineffective, died.
Of course, Iraq is not Germany. The conflicts now differ widely from the conflicts then. The legitimacy of the Iraqi government has not yet been fatally compromised. And an external power retains some capacity to influence the outcome. But the challenge is a difficult one. Each of the three sides must, somehow, engender trust in the other two. Trust is not liking. It is simply the belief that the other will abide by the rules of democratic government, that it will accept those limits.
The results of the violence that followed the destruction of the mosque are as yet unclear. It may have scared the sides into compromise. But it may also lead Iraqis to seek security provided by their own kind. This is a turning point for Iraq and the American enterprise there. The only thing certain is that the promise of democracy alone will not suffice.
History has shown that democracies yield the peace. Europe is free, whole, and at peace because the nations are democratic. That wasn't always the case, obviously, in the 1900s. Two major wars were fought where a lot of Americans died, and yet systems and forms of government changed. And now Europe is completely different, in terms of security and peace. The Far East -- I just mentioned the Japanese example. And that's what the enemy understands, and that's why they're so brutal and relentless. They understand the march of peace will be contagious. Part of my decision-making process is my firm belief in the natural rights of men and women; my belief that deep in everybody's soul is the desire to live free. I believe there's an Almighty, and I believe the Almighty's great gift to each man and woman in this world is the desire to be free. This isn't America's gift to the world, it is a universal gift to the world, and people want to be free. (Applause.)
And if you believe that, and if you believe freedom yields the peace, it's important for the United States of America, with friends, to lead the cause of liberty.
This is a marvelous vision, one that many people share, and not just in the United States. Why, then, do people in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere reject democracy, or at least do not embrace it? The answer to this question is a key to understanding what is happening in Iraq. It seems that when we "broke" Iraq we believed in the universality of this vision, that no sane person could fight against it.
There have been many ideological and religious arguments against democracy. Lenin and Hitler made theirs, which amounted to the need for a small group or leader, armed with a true understanding of the world, to take charge and foster change in the polity. The masses could not be trusted to act unguided. Before these 20th Century monsters, royalists made their own form of the argument. Long before that, Plato did much the same thing. Bin Laden and the jihadis, calling on the true followers of Muhammed, are the most recent bears of this tradition.
But the essence of the weakness of democracy in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, or Weimer Germany stems from something more basic than the somewhat abstract and convoluted thinking of Bolsheviks, Nazis, and Jihadis. People crave security. They want to exile fear. Where democracy is weak, fear runs rampant.
Democracy requires trust. As a citizen, you have to trust that the people you live and work with will adhere to democratic processes, that they will accept the limitations that democracy imposes. These limits have to do with the power of the state, which, following Weber, holds a monopoly on the use of force--it controls the army, the police, and other institutions that are licensed to use force.
But in Iraq and Afghanistan, that trust is absent. So is the monopoly on the use of force. People must rely on the means available to them and their neighbors to defend themselves.
Before the destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, the Sunni-dominated insurgency was the major apparent source of fear. The link between the insecurity the insurgency has fostered and the success of our democratic project in Iraq has been recognized by the United States. From all appearances, significant progress has been made in at least parts of Iraq in reducing the fear felt by the population. The rising totals of people goaing to the polls through 2005 is an indication of that. (Whether the progress has been sufficient is a different question.)
But the destruction of the mosque has clarifed the threats to democracy in Iraq. It is now clear that Iraqis have reason to fear each other. The insurgents, particularly Zarqawi's group, are bringing their murderous antipathy to the Shiites to the fore. Shiites have replied in kind. All are adding to memories from Iraqi history of brutality that have left suspicions, fears, that will not dissipate. Each group has given the others reasons to distrust it: Sunni massacres of Shiites in 1991 and throughout Saddam's regime; Sunni memories of Shiite insurgents under British rule; Kurdish experiences as targets of Arabs and Turks over a century and more. They all can declare a right to vengeance and exercise it.
What has become most clear is that each group is turning to its own to defend itself against the others. The Sunnis have insurgents. The Kurds have had their own militias for decades. Now the Shiites have the Mahdi Army and the like. In short, the Iraqi democracy has no monopoly of force, particularly as the army and police are formed of ethnic-based units, many of which seem to have more loyalty to their own kind than to the Iraqi state.
This is much like a communalist riff on Weimar Germany. In the 1920s, all large German political parties--nationalist, socialist, or communist--had its own group of thugs. The most renowned of these, of course, was the SA, the brownshirts. When economic security disappeared as the Depression deepened, the strength of these groups grew. Each group assaulted its enemies, with little interference from the republic. The Nazis, promising security, triumphed. Democracy, illegitimate, ineffective, died.
Of course, Iraq is not Germany. The conflicts now differ widely from the conflicts then. The legitimacy of the Iraqi government has not yet been fatally compromised. And an external power retains some capacity to influence the outcome. But the challenge is a difficult one. Each of the three sides must, somehow, engender trust in the other two. Trust is not liking. It is simply the belief that the other will abide by the rules of democratic government, that it will accept those limits.
The results of the violence that followed the destruction of the mosque are as yet unclear. It may have scared the sides into compromise. But it may also lead Iraqis to seek security provided by their own kind. This is a turning point for Iraq and the American enterprise there. The only thing certain is that the promise of democracy alone will not suffice.
06 March 2006
Invasion of Privacy
Bruce Schneier has a column on the threats to privacy that the advance of computer technology is generating. The march of technology, he argues, "has resulted in the almost constant surveillance of everyone, with profound implications for our society and our freedoms." Therefore, he continues, we need laws to protect our privacy as strong as those of the Europeans. Can he be right? European law, particularly as issued by Brussels, has tended to produce economic stagnation (examine the economic growth rates of European countries compared to those of the United States). And few of us feel an immediate threat of persecution by our government or private enterprise. Yet threats exist, as Schneier points out, and we would be foolish not to consider them.
There are two drivers that are increasing the threats to our privacy. One, of course, represented by the spat over surveillance by the NSA, is security. The other is convenience. Most of us are willing to give up a part of our privacy if we can increase either one of these. The question is how much privacy are we willing we give up?
This problem is that this will change; we will give it up by degrees and find that the next bit is not so precious after all. One day, however, we'll find that we miss it. People are like this. You have only to look at what was shocking in popular entertainment just twenty years ago and what is perfectly acceptable now. Martin Niemöller found the same phenomenon in a different context:
Privacy seems destined to follow a similar path. Who would not allow our security agencies to listen in on people who seem to be allied to Al Qaeda? We value our own privacy, not theirs. And who does not give the information, hardly precious, that Amazon, Yahoo, Google, or a credit card company requests in exchange for easy access to the delights they dangle before us?
But once it's gone, how do we get it back? And when organizations or groups, governmental or private, use it to pursue interests contraposed to ours, will there be anyone left to speak for us?
Privacy is maintained through both custom and law. Would that custom alone would suffice. But it will not, or so it appears. We must, alas, rely on law instead to protect us. If we cannot, then we may find that a dystopia has become our own brave new world.
There are two drivers that are increasing the threats to our privacy. One, of course, represented by the spat over surveillance by the NSA, is security. The other is convenience. Most of us are willing to give up a part of our privacy if we can increase either one of these. The question is how much privacy are we willing we give up?
This problem is that this will change; we will give it up by degrees and find that the next bit is not so precious after all. One day, however, we'll find that we miss it. People are like this. You have only to look at what was shocking in popular entertainment just twenty years ago and what is perfectly acceptable now. Martin Niemöller found the same phenomenon in a different context:
First they came for the Jews
and I did not speak out
because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for the Communists
and I did not speak out
because I was not a Communist.
Then they came for the trade unionists
and I did not speak out
because I was not a trade unionist.
Then they came for me
and there was no one left
to speak out for me.
Privacy seems destined to follow a similar path. Who would not allow our security agencies to listen in on people who seem to be allied to Al Qaeda? We value our own privacy, not theirs. And who does not give the information, hardly precious, that Amazon, Yahoo, Google, or a credit card company requests in exchange for easy access to the delights they dangle before us?
But once it's gone, how do we get it back? And when organizations or groups, governmental or private, use it to pursue interests contraposed to ours, will there be anyone left to speak for us?
Privacy is maintained through both custom and law. Would that custom alone would suffice. But it will not, or so it appears. We must, alas, rely on law instead to protect us. If we cannot, then we may find that a dystopia has become our own brave new world.
23 February 2006
Civil War?
The destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra has brought Iraq to the brink of the civil war that has been threatened since the collapse of Saddam's dictatorship released the bonds that had held the sectarian and ethnic divisions of the country in check. Make no mistake, this is an event that will have long-term consequences.
It has already strengthened the militias that provide the Shiites in particular, but the Kurds as well, with an armed force that at best dilutes the power of the Iraqi government. It may be that Shiite reprisals have, in their turn, strengthened the appeal of the domestic insurgents, allies of Zarqawi's terrorists, who are likely to have bombed the mosque. The Sunni party involved in the talks to form a new government has suspended the negotiations, demanding an apology from the Shia. This makes it even less likely than before than a non-sectarian, all-inclusive government will be formed.
Calls from both Sunni and Shiite leaders for calm are encouraging. But they have come with accusations from all sides that the United States bears responsibility for the bombing and from the Sunnis that Shiite leaders are doing too little to minimize retaliation. Moreover, according to The Washington Post, Sistani issued a statement that "If its security institutions are unable to provide the necessary security, the faithful are able to do that by the will and blessings of God."
The longer the openly sectarian violence continues, the less likely it will be that a united, peaceful Iraq can emerge from the ashes left by our destruction of Saddam's regime. What do we do then? What can we do now to try to undo the harm that has been done?
Withdrawal is the simple answer, of course. But we still have a role that we can play if Iraq does not swirl out of control. Our forces are not insubstantial, after all, and we have immense resources that we can draw on to improve the situation. We still have a responsibility to do what we can.
It has already strengthened the militias that provide the Shiites in particular, but the Kurds as well, with an armed force that at best dilutes the power of the Iraqi government. It may be that Shiite reprisals have, in their turn, strengthened the appeal of the domestic insurgents, allies of Zarqawi's terrorists, who are likely to have bombed the mosque. The Sunni party involved in the talks to form a new government has suspended the negotiations, demanding an apology from the Shia. This makes it even less likely than before than a non-sectarian, all-inclusive government will be formed.
Calls from both Sunni and Shiite leaders for calm are encouraging. But they have come with accusations from all sides that the United States bears responsibility for the bombing and from the Sunnis that Shiite leaders are doing too little to minimize retaliation. Moreover, according to The Washington Post, Sistani issued a statement that "If its security institutions are unable to provide the necessary security, the faithful are able to do that by the will and blessings of God."
The longer the openly sectarian violence continues, the less likely it will be that a united, peaceful Iraq can emerge from the ashes left by our destruction of Saddam's regime. What do we do then? What can we do now to try to undo the harm that has been done?
Withdrawal is the simple answer, of course. But we still have a role that we can play if Iraq does not swirl out of control. Our forces are not insubstantial, after all, and we have immense resources that we can draw on to improve the situation. We still have a responsibility to do what we can.
11 January 2006
Zero Day Exploit
A recent problem with an ancient file-type found in Microsoft products raises a host of questions about how ready we are to face computer attacks. This vulnerability was described as a zero-day exploit. That is, the vulnerability was discovered and ready for exploitation well before it could be patched. As it happened, the vulnerability was made public on December 26, a third party patch (written by a single developer, Ilfan Guilfanov) was issued on December 31, and Microsoft issued its own patch on January 4, six days before the next set of patches was scheduled to be issued.
I wrote about one question all this raises in a response to a post on the SecuriTeam blog
There must be a way for Microsoft to respond more quickly. Interestingly, Microsoft's OneCare program told its customers that the problem was solved several days before the patch was issued. But other questions arise as well. Can we--should we--rely on third party patches like those Guilfanov created. At about the time his patch came out, the Metasploit project issued a way of exploiting the vulnerability. They argued that it gave the good guys a way to test the vulnerability of their systems. But the bad guys latched onto it to create additional exploits. Did they issue their framework for exploiting the vulnerability too soon? Or are they really allies of the bad guys?
In more general terms: What should we do about old code that was not written with security in mind? Do we really have to keep it? If not, who is responsible for the problems it causes? After all, updating any software has costs--monetary and in the time it takes to learn it.
It was a fascinating series of events. You can expect a paper about them.
I wrote about one question all this raises in a response to a post on the SecuriTeam blog
Microsoft has institutional problems with fixes that good will, excellent design, and technical acuity cannot solve.
Consider the recent wmf vulnerability. Microsoft put 200 people to work to find the fix. Once it was found, it had to be tested extensively. Once approved, the documentation for it had to be translated into more than 20 languages.
Microsoft's customers require all this. They have also preferred to have all fixes come on a predictable schedule.
Given that all this is required, and that it takes time, Microsoft showed remarkable flexibility and speed. To ask them to react as quickly as Ilfan Guilfanov, who wrote and issued a patch in a matter of hours, would be to ask a supertanker to turn on a dime.
This is neither simply to praise Microsoft nor to offer one more argument for abandoning IE. It is to outline a problem that affects all of us when the millions of users who rely on Microsoft get attacked.
There must be a way for Microsoft to respond more quickly. Interestingly, Microsoft's OneCare program told its customers that the problem was solved several days before the patch was issued. But other questions arise as well. Can we--should we--rely on third party patches like those Guilfanov created. At about the time his patch came out, the Metasploit project issued a way of exploiting the vulnerability. They argued that it gave the good guys a way to test the vulnerability of their systems. But the bad guys latched onto it to create additional exploits. Did they issue their framework for exploiting the vulnerability too soon? Or are they really allies of the bad guys?
In more general terms: What should we do about old code that was not written with security in mind? Do we really have to keep it? If not, who is responsible for the problems it causes? After all, updating any software has costs--monetary and in the time it takes to learn it.
It was a fascinating series of events. You can expect a paper about them.
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