10 September 2005

Katrina and FEMA

The best comment on the response to Katrina comes from Bruce Schneier. He says that DHS, including FEMA, should focus on gathering intelligence and responding to emergencies, rather than developing measures designed to prevent terrorism that are bound to be ineffective, like profiling passengers and developing a national ID card.

Indeed, the inattention paid to FEMA over the last few years, particularly since 9/11, is puzzling and, to be kind, myopic. If terrorists had caused a disaster, would not FEMA had been called in? Nor have we been able to postpone natural disasters for duration of the war on terrorism. If FEMA stops being left to people whose most impressive quality is the strength of their political contacts, we may do better with the next emergency than we did with this one.

On the other hand, two friends provide a different perspective on what FEMA has done. Given what it has been designed to do, it has not performed all that badly. Bruce Henderson wrote the Morris Dance Discussion List about his own experience with a hurricane-induced flood in North Carolina. He found that

The Federal government response was much the same. It takes time to assure that the storm has past, then the type of storm damage must be quantified (you really have to deal with a wind-hurricane much differently from a flood-hurricane). Then advance teams have to work out logistics (do people need food more than medical help? Or is a police presence needed first? Are airports open*? Our local airport was flooded and couldn't be used -- and teams have to open roads. Even the Interstates in our area were blocked -- trees were literally broken in half and blown in the road. It took highway crews 3 1/2 days to fully open I-40 from I-95 to Wilmington but some of that delay was waiting for flood water to go down. But a number of areas had been so badly flooded that large trucks couldn't get through.

Once the situation has been analyzed, then the agencies affected (mostly governmental, plus a very large input from the power companies) can agree and Federal agencies can be authorized by local government. Then, coordination between the different groups must be set up.

I asked another friend with extensive experience in disaster relief with FEMA about New Orleans. Bruce's message confirmed what he told me: FEMA was not set up to provide instant response. It is set up to go into an area after the storm has done its worst and some measure of stability has been reached. He did not think this approach best and suggested to his superiors at FEMA that somthing else be tried. In regard to New Orleans in particular, he favored making sure that what would be needed would be in place beforehand and that the more vulnerable people--he had older peoole in mind in particular--be removed before the storm hit.

That approach would probably have prevented much of the horrible scenes that we are now watching in New Orleans. But it has two problems. First, it is expensive. Damn the expense, you might say, people's lives are at stake. Consider the second problem, however: most threats of disaster are false alarms. For each Katrina, several storms will pass by. Yet for each one, preparations will be made and people will be removed. You cannot tell beforehand which alarm will prove real and which false. How many of us will willingly relocate once each year or two to prevent what is, in truth, a remote chance that harm will befall us? Consider that the levees in New Orleans had held for more than a century. that, more than any failure on the part of the Army Corps of Engineers, explains why the levees had not been strengthened. The vulnerability was known but the risk was deemed too small. For the same reason, I find that most people do not back up the data on their computers. As someone who works on computer security, I believe they are shortsighted, but like the people responsible for New Orleans, they choose not to take the time and spend the money to make themselves less vulnerable.

FEMA's plans and actions are the result of political choices made from the day it was organized. There can be little doubt that the agency needs to be reorganized and that it can become more effective. Indeed, my friend stopped working for FEMA because he believed that the agencies managers were serving political expediency rather than the public interest. But that was in the 1990s, when President Bush's work address was in Austin, not Washington.

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