What to do with North Korea

Yesterday's announcement by North Korea that it had nuclear weapons was an unpleasant surprise that will force the Bush administration--and other governments--to make unpleasant choices. It must choose between accepting the new, more dangerous, status quo or to force a crisis will potentially catastrophic consequences.

The North Korean regime has shown more than once that it is comfortable with brinkmanship. Nor is it at all clear that they know where the brink is. They are quite capable of crossing it. Put another way, their rationality can be questioned, which is never a good quality to find in either side during a crisis.

So, what can be done? Can we dissuade the North Koreans from remaining a nuclear power? They clearly take pride in joining the nuclear club. Judging from their statements, they see the United States as inalterably opposed to them. The United States is, by assumption, an enemy, and, by rhetoric, shall forever be so. Bush administration policy can be blamed in part. From the beginning, it has taken a hard line against North Korea in general. In particular, they have been allergic to talking to it, especially one-on-one. But paranoia of the regime make it likely that it would find even the most conciliatory occupant of the White House hostile.

Can we bring pressure on them? We have no trade to speak of, nothing to withhold. Military action is always dangerous, but the willingness of the North Koreans to court danger makes it especially perilous. How might they react? By attacking South Korea? By setting off a nuclear device? One has to expect the worst possible actions imaginable that they might take. In addition, any military action we take must have permanent effects. Otherwise, we will have simply postponed the inevitable. The effects of any action short of occupation of the country are likely to be temporary. There is scarcely a need to point out why we cannot try to invade and occupy it. Nor do I see policymakers in Washington, Beijing, or elsewhere advocating such a step.

In truth, we do not have the leverage to do anything effectively on our own. Others--the Chinese, the Russians, the Japanese, the South Koreans--have more tools available. The Chinese in particular could wreak havoc on the weak North Korean economy. Any action the United States takes must be taken in concert with others. But do they see the threat from North Korea as dire enough to threaten actions severe enough to get the North Koreans to renounce weapons that they seem clearly to want? It seems not.

It seems almost inevitable that we and the rest of the world will come to accept North Korea into the nuclear club. We will, sooner or later, begin to talk to it with the aim of reducing the dangers that their nuclear weapons pose. This is far from ideal. The Kim Il-Sung regime is dangerous and loathsome. Any moves toward the new nuclear power threaten to encourage others tempted by the nuclear genii.

Yet, as I have suggested, there is little choice in the longer term. A good aspect of beginning to talk now, rather than simply bluster and threaten actions that are not likely to get North Korea to renounce the weapons they have acquired, is that we may be able to sow seeds of trust that might blossom when the current regime disappears. And it will. After all, no communist regime is forever.